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Airlines wanting to cooperatively set prices for their international air travel service must apply to the relevant authorities for antitrust 
immunity (ATI).  Whether consumers, on net, benefit from a grant of ATI to partner airlines has caused much public debate.  This 
paper investigates the impact of granting ATI to oneworld alliance members on their price, markup, and various measures of cost.  
The evidence suggests that implementation of the oneworld alliance without ATI did not have a statistically significant impact on 
the markup of products offered by the members, and there is no evidence that the subsequent grant of ATI to various members 
resulted in higher markups on their products.  We find evidence suggesting that the grant of ATI facilitated a decrease in partner 
carriers’ marginal and fixed costs.  Furthermore, member carriers’ price did not increase (decreased) in markets where their services 
do (do not) overlap, implying that consumers, on net, benefit from the grant of ATI in terms of price changes.   
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The expansion of international airline alliances since the 1990s has drawn considerable attention of 
researchers and policymakers.  The three major global airline alliances are: Star, SkyTeam, and oneworld.  By 
joining a global alliance, an airline can leverage its partner carriers’ route networks to extend its service to 
destinations in foreign countries that the airline could not otherwise serve using its own planes.  Even though 
such interline service may be available to passengers without an alliance between the carriers, partner carriers 
in an alliance typically coordinate in an effort to make interline transfers seamless for passengers.  In addition, 
partner carriers typically make their frequent-flyer programs reciprocal, thus allowing passengers with 
membership in any partner carrier’s frequent-flyer program to accumulate and redeem frequent-flyer points 
across any carrier of the alliance.  
Alliance partners often want to extend cooperation to revenue sharing, which effectively implies joint 
pricing of products.  This type of cooperation in markets where the partners each offer substitute service is 
believed to harm competition and therefore violates antitrust laws.  As such, alliance partners can only 
explicitly collude on price if the relevant authorities in each country exempt the partner carriers from 
prosecution under the country’s antitrust laws – a grant of antitrust immunity.   
To explicitly collude on price, airlines must first formally apply to the relevant authorities for antitrust 
immunity (ATI).  The application process provides carriers with the opportunity to make their case to the 
relevant authorities that the level of cooperation that ATI would allow will yield net benefits to consumers.  A 
grant of ATI is usually justified on grounds that the cooperative actions of partner carriers that are in violation 
of antitrust laws produce benefits to consumers that are sufficient to outweigh the cost of reduced competition.  
Furthermore, the relevant authorities can grant ATI with the restriction that antitrust immune partners cannot 
explicitly collude in certain markets, deemed carve-out markets, that the authorities believe will on net yield 
worse welfare outcomes due to reduced competition between the antitrust immune partners.1      
There are numerous instances since the 1990s in which airlines have been successful in convincing the 
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) that granting them ATI is, 
on net, beneficial for consumers.  However, in recent time the DOJ has argued that ATI is not necessary for an 
alliance to yield net benefits for consumers and alliance carriers.  In 2009 DOJ expressed this view in 
commenting on the joint application for antitrust immunity from five members of the oneworld alliance.2  
Furthermore, DOJ points out that granting these airlines antitrust immunity will reduce competition in origin-
                                                                
1 See Gayle and Thomas (2016) for an empirical analysis of the effectiveness of carve-out policy.  
2  See: OST-2008-0252 – Public Version Comments of the Department of Justice.  Document can be downloaded at: 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/comments/253575.htm. 
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destination markets between the U.S. and Europe where these carriers compete using nonstop flights. 
Despite DOJ’s concerns regarding granting ATI to these airlines, the DOT was convinced that there 
are sufficient efficiency gains associated with granting the carriers ATI, such that on net consumers would 
ultimately benefit.  Since it is the DOT that has the statutory authority to approve and immunize from the U.S. 
antitrust laws agreements relating to international air transportation, DOT granted the carriers ATI in year 
2010.  Given the opposing positions that these two key government authorities took in this case, it is necessary 
to carefully study these issues to facilitate future policymaking decisions of this nature.  As such, this paper 
has two main objectives: (1) investigate the effects of granting ATI on price, markup, and various categories 
of partner carriers' costs; and (2) investigate the relative effects of implementing an alliance without ATI versus 
an alliance with ATI.      
There has been extensive work examining the airfare effect of alliances.  Many studies find that airline 
cooperation due to an alliance puts downward pressure on fares in interline markets due to product 
complementarity and the mitigation of double marginalization.3 However, as previously suggested, an alliance 
can also reduce competition in markets where the partners’ route networks overlap (typically their interhub 
markets), which would put pressure on fares to rise in these markets.  Zou, Oum and Yu (2011) argue that it is 
possible that an alliance causes fares to increase even in markets where the partners’ route segments are 
complementary rather than overlapping, since the quality of interline connections improves with an alliance 
and consequently demand may increase owing to product quality improvements.  
The arguments above describe situations in which an alliance may affect price via influencing the 
carriers’ optimal choice of product price markup over marginal cost.  So the predicted price effects based on 
the previously discussed arguments assume that marginal cost is unchanged.  However, an alliance may 
influence partner carriers’ marginal cost of transporting passengers.  Specifically, by appropriately integrating 
their route networks, partner carriers can better fill their planes on a segment of an interline trip by channeling 
passengers from different origins through a common trip segment.  Such cooperation enables carriers to exploit 
economies of passenger-traffic density, i.e., the marginal cost of transporting a passenger on a route is lower 
the more passengers that the airline transports on segments of the route [Brueckner and Spiller (1994); 
Brueckner (2001 and 2003); Gresik and Mansley (2001); and Keeler and Formby (1994)]. 
Gayle and Le (2013) argue that an alliance may not only influence partner carriers’ marginal cost, but 
also their recurrent fixed and sunk market entry costs.  A carrier’s market entry cost may fall because the 
alliance effectively allows the carrier to enter several new origin-destination markets more cheaply by 
                                                                
3 See Brueckner and Whalen (2000); Brueckner (2001 and 2003); Bamberger, Carlton and Neumann (2004); Ito and Lee (2007); 
Gayle (2008 and 2013); Gayle and Brown (2014); Whalen (2007); Zou, Oum, Yu (2011) among others. 
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leveraging its partners’ network rather than having to exclusively use its own planes to enter these markets.  
They point out that a carriers’ recurrent fixed cost may either rise or fall due to the alliance.  For example, 
accommodating a higher volume of passengers may require partner carriers to acquire more airport gates and 
a larger airport staff to handle more intensive airport operations, which would increase partners’ recurrent 
fixed cost.  On the other hand, alliance partners often share their airport facilities (lounges, gates, check-in 
counters etc.), and ground and flight personnel, which may result in more efficient use of airport facilities and 
staff, and therefore effectively yield recurrent fixed cost savings [Park (1997)].  In their empirical investigation 
of the cost effects of the US domestic alliance between Delta, Continental and Northwest airlines, Gayle and 
Le (2013) find evidence that this alliance influenced the partner carriers’ marginal, recurrent fixed, and sunk 
market entry costs.  
It is important to note that the analysis in Gayle and Le (2013) focus on a US domestic airline alliance, 
which is not eligible to be granted ATI.  In contrast to Gayle and Le (2013), our analysis focuses on an 
international alliance (a subset of the alliance members are distinct national carriers), which initially formed 
and operated for a number of years before ATI was granted to a subset of its member carriers.  As such, unlike 
Gayle and Le (2013), we are able to separately analyze the impacts of ATI on prices, markups, and various 
types of costs.  Since ATI allows carriers to explicitly cooperate on market transactions without fear of being 
in violation of antitrust laws due to such cooperation, we can expect greater cooperation between carriers that 
have ATI compared to carriers that do not have ATI.  Greater cooperation can result in better route network 
integration across partner carriers, which may better enable partner carriers to exploit economies of passenger-
traffic density to achieve lower per passenger cost.  Lower costs may also be achieved if cooperation extends 
to ATI partner carriers’ joint purchase of essential inputs such as fuel.  
Gayle and Xie (2018) examine whether codesharing between market incumbents may serve to deter 
potential entrants to a market.  The analytical setting and issues investigated in that paper differs from this 
paper in two important ways.  First, Gayle and Xie (2018) examine how codesharing between alliance partners 
affects the market entry cost of other carriers that are potential competitors, while in this paper we examine 
whether the alliance partners’ own market entry costs are influenced by operating within the alliance.  Second, 
Gayle and Xie (2018) focus on US domestic airline alliances, which are not eligible to be granted ATI, while 
in the present paper we focus on an international alliance that is eligible for, and was granted, ATI.               
Based on the preceding discussions, the effect of alliances on fares may depend on the relative 
magnitudes of cost-savings and optimal markup changes.  A retrospective assessment of cost changes separate 
from markup changes associated with an alliance before and after antitrust immunity is granted may provide 
policymakers with some perspective on the efficacy of granting antitrust immunity.  Our study focuses on 
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identifying these effects in case of the oneworld alliance. 
Researchers have investigated the relative effects of a codeshare alliance with and without ATI.  For 
example, Bruckner (2003) finds that the effect of codesharing on fares is smaller than the effect of ATI, while 
Whalen (2007) finds a similar result and additionally finds that prices for immunized alliance service are equal 
to online service.  Bruckner, Lee and Singer (2011) show that codesharing, alliance service, and ATI each 
separately reduces fares below the traditional interline level, while Bilotkach (2005) shows that granting ATI 
pushes up fares for non-stop trips between hub airports and does not generate any additional benefits to 
interline passengers, as compared with alliances without immunity.  
None of the studies separately identify the effects of an alliance and ATI on markup versus cost, which 
is essential to better understand the efficacy of granting ATI.  Therefore, a key distinguishing feature of our 
study from others in the literature is that we use a structural model to disentangle markup changes from cost 
changes associated with an alliance and ATI.   
Even though Gayle and Thomas (2016) also provide a structural econometric analysis of international 
airline alliances, their analysis focuses on the effectiveness of carve-out policy in particular, while our analysis 
more broadly examines the impacts of airlines being granted ATI.  Furthermore, unlike Gayle and Thomas 
(2016), our structural econometric model incorporates a dynamic entry/exit game.  The dynamic entry/exit 
game allows us to examine the impacts of ATI on recurrent fixed costs and sunk market entry costs, which are 
types of costs not considered in Gayle and Thomas (2016).  Using existing market data for price, markup and 
marginal cost analysis is typically most useful to capture shorter horizon price, markup and marginal cost 
impacts conditional on existing market structure.  However, one way to think about the importance of 
considering ATI’s impacts on recurrent fixed costs and sunk market entry costs, is that these costs are more 
relevant in determining the medium to long run structure of a market, which ultimately impacts future prices 
and more importantly welfare.    
The following is a brief description of our research methodology.  We first specify and estimate air 
travel demand using a discrete choice model.  Then, for the short-run supply-side, we assume that multiproduct 
airlines set prices for their differentiated products according to a Nash equilibrium price-setting game.  The 
Nash equilibrium price-setting assumption allows us to derive product-specific markups and recover product-
level marginal costs.  With the estimated marginal costs in hand, we are able to specify and estimate a marginal 
cost function.  The marginal cost specification allows us to estimate marginal cost changes for the alliance 
members across pre-post periods of implementation of the alliance without ATI.  Similarly, we are able to 
estimate marginal cost changes for the alliance members across pre-post periods of obtaining ATI.  With 
product-level markup estimates in hand, we then separately specify and estimate markup equations that 
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identify changes in the alliance members’ markup across pre-post periods of alliance implementation and 
pre-post periods of obtaining ATI, respectively.  
Next, we compute firm-level variable profits using the derived product markups and product quantities 
sold.  With data on markets in which each firm is active or not during specific time periods, as well as our 
estimates of their variable profits when they are active in markets, we are able to estimate a dynamic entry/exit 
game.  The dynamic entry/exit game allows us to estimate recurrent fixed cost and market entry cost functions.  
These functions are specified to identify changes in alliance partners’ recurrent fixed and market entry costs 
across pre-post periods of alliance implementation and pre-post periods of obtaining ATI, respectively. 
Our econometric estimates suggest the following.  First, implementation of the oneworld alliance did 
not have a statistically significant impact on the markup of products offered by the members, and there is no 
evidence that the subsequent grant of ATI to various members resulted in higher markups on their products.  
Second, we did not find any evidence that implementation of the oneworld alliance created marginal cost 
efficiencies, but we do find evidence suggesting that the subsequent grant of ATI to some oneworld members 
is associated with a reduction in these members’ marginal costs.  So the evidence does support the argument 
that granting of ATI better enables members to achieve cost efficiency gains, perhaps due to more effective 
cooperation between these members.  Third, the dynamic entry/exit part of the model did not produce any 
statistically discernible evidence that implementation of the oneworld alliance influenced members recurrent 
fixed or market entry costs, but reveals evidence that the subsequent grant of ATI to some oneworld members 
is associated with fixed cost efficiency gains, but no evidence of market entry cost changes for these ATI 
members. 
Last, we find evidence suggesting that the grant of ATI to various members is associated with a decline 
in their price in markets where their services do not overlap.  Furthermore, the evidence suggest that prices 
did not increase in markets where their services do overlap. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 provides relevant background 
information on the oneworld alliance and subsequent grant of ATI to various members of the alliance.  We 
define some relevant concepts and discuss the data in section 3.  In section 4 we present our econometric 
model.  In section 5 we discuss estimation procedures.  Estimation results are presented and discussed in 






2. Background Information on oneworld Alliance and Antitrust Immunity 
On September 21, 1998, American Airlines, British Airways, Canadian Airlines4, Cathay Pacific, and 
Qantas unveiled the formation of oneworld, one of the world’s three largest global airline alliances.  The other 
two major global alliances are Star Alliance and SkyTeam.  The oneworld alliance was officially launched 
and started its operation on February 1, 1999.  Since its inception, several airlines have joined the alliance.  
Table A1 in Appendix A lists members of the alliance at the beginning of 2013.  A few more airlines are 
expected to enter the alliance in 2013-2014.  The central office for the alliance is based in New York City, 
New York, in the U.S.  
The oneworld alliance global airline network provides services to more than 800 destinations in over 
150 countries.5  It is argued that flying with oneworld allows passengers to enjoy multiple privileges.  For 
example, a passenger who is a member of the frequent-flyer program (FFP) offered by a oneworld carrier is 
able to earn and redeem frequent-flyer points across other oneworld partner carriers.  Second, smooth transfer 
between partner airlines brings more convenience and reduces layover time for passengers.6 
Foreign and major U.S. airlines may request a grant of immunity from the U.S. antitrust laws to operate 
certain commercial alliances.  Airlines with immunity can coordinate their fares, services, and capacity as if 
they were a single carrier in origin-destination markets. Table A2 in Appendix A lists airline alliances 
operating with antitrust immunity.  On August 14, 2008, five members of the oneworld alliance, American 
Airlines; British Airways; Finnair; Iberia; and Royal Jordanian Airlines, jointly applied for antitrust immunity 
for a set of bilateral and multilateral alliance agreements.  The DOT tentatively approved and granted antitrust 
immunity to alliance agreements between and among the five airlines on February 13, 2010,7 and issued a 
final order of approval on July 20, 2010. 
As part of the approval, American, British Airways and Iberia can implement a joint business venture 
(JBA) to connect their transatlantic flight services more closely.  However, the grant of immunity is subject to 
a slot remedy.  A “slot” is the name given to an airline’s right to land and takeoff at a given airport.  The slot 
remedy requires the airlines to transfer four slot pairs at London Heathrow to competitors for a period of at 
least 10 years.8  The rationale put forth by the DOT is that this slot remedy will sufficiently lower market entry 
                                                                
4 Canadian Airlines was acquired by Air Canada in 2000 and then exited oneworld alliance. 
5 Oneworld at a glance http://www.oneworld.com/news-information/oneworld-fact-sheets/oneworld-at-a-glance 
6 This information is attained from http://www.oneworld.com/ffp/. 
7 Order 2010-2-13 found at http://www.airlineinfo.com/ostdocket2010/order20100208.html 
8 Order 2010-7-8 - American, British Airways, Finnair, Iberia and Royal Jordanian - Final Order - Antitrust Immunity.  Issued by 
United States Department of Transportation.  Document can be downloaded at: 
http://www.airlineinfo.com/ostdocket2010/order20100708.html 
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barriers for potential competitors, and therefore effectively constrain anticompetitive behavior of the antitrust 
immune carriers. 9 
American Airlines, which serves 273 cities in 51 countries, is one of the largest carriers in the world 
with total revenues of about $25 billion in 2013.10 American’s primary hubs are based in Dallas, Chicago, and 
Miami.  British Airways, which is also among the world’s largest international airlines, is the flag carrier 
airline of the United Kingdom and has its main hub at London Heathrow Airport.  In addition, British Airways 
serves 190 cities in 89 countries.  Iberia, the largest airline of Spain, merged with British Airways on November 
29, 2010.  These three airlines provide the vast majority of oneworld service between the U.S. and Europe and 
they codeshare 11  among each other.  Finnair and Royal Jordanian provide a very limited amount of 
transatlantic service. 
The application for ATI by oneworld members in 2008, which was eventually granted in 2010, was 
actually the third attempt by oneworld members to seek ATI.  The previous two attempts were unsuccessful.  
The first of the previous two attempts came in 1997 when American and British Airways applied for ATI, but 
the DOT dismissed the application due to failure of the liberalization of the Bermuda II Treaty.12  In 2001, the 
carriers again requested antitrust immunity and DOT issued a show cause order to grant immunity 
conditionally.  However, American and British Airways withdrew their application. 
In their application of 2008, the five oneworld alliance applicants claim that they seek antitrust 
immunity in order to better compete with SkyTeam and Star alliances, which both had received immunity.  
The oneworld alliance applicants stated that: “The recent expansion of Star and SkyTeam makes the proposed 
alliance necessary to maintain inter-alliance competition and to achieve the full benefits of U.S. – EU Open 
Skies.”13,14  They believe that the transatlantic network integration from antitrust immunity and JBA could 
allow the applicants to provide services to more markets between oneworld hubs, Star and SkyTeam hubs, and 
spoke cities in Europe, thus facilitating the inter-alliance competition.  In addition, the applicants assert that 
approval of the antitrust immunity and JBA will bring a number of benefits to both consumers and the 
                                                                
9  Order 2010-2-8 issued by the United Sates Department of Transportation.  Document can be downloaded at:  
http://www.mainjustice.com/files/2010/02/DOT-BA-AA-Approval.pdf  
10 Oneworld at a glance at http://www.oneworld.com/news-information/oneworld-fact-sheets/oneworld-at-a-glance 
11 Codeshare is the name given to agreements between partner carriers that allow a carrier to market and sell tickets to 
consumers for seats on its partners’ plane.   
12 Bernuda II treaty was a bilateral air transport agreement between the governments of the United States and the United Kingdom 
signed on 23 July 1977.  
13 In 2007, the United States and the European Union signed a new “open skies” to replace Bermuda II. 
14 For summary of arguments that applicants made in their joint application see: OST-2008-0252 – Public Version Comments of 
the Department of Justice. Document can be downloaded at: http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/comments/253575.htm. 
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applicants’ employees and shareholders.  
In response to the application, DOJ issued a recommendation report on the possible market effects of 
granting antitrust immunity.15  DOJ strongly believes that granting antitrust immunity would harm competition 
in transatlantic markets.  Specifically, DOJ argues that the reduction in number of nonstop competitors caused 
by granting immunity would likely result in significant fare increases.  In addition, DOJ believes that entry is 
difficult in hub-to-hub routes and thus is unlikely to inhibit price increases.  Moreover, DOJ suggests that 
immunity is not required to achieve the benefits claimed in the application. 
 
3. Definitions and Data 
3.1 Definitions 
We now define some important concepts that are used throughout this paper.  A market is defined as 
directional pair of origin and destination airports during a particular time period.  For example, irrespective of 
intermediate stop(s), one market constitutes air travel from Los Angeles International airport to London 
Heathrow airport during the first quarter of 1998.  A flight itinerary is a detailed plan for roundtrip air travel 
that includes all airport stops from origin to destination and back to origin. 
Each segment of a trip (air travel between two airports) has a ticket coupon. For each coupon there is 
an operating carrier and a ticketing carrier.  The operating carrier is the airline that actually uses its own plane 
to transport passengers, while the ticketing carrier, also referred to as marketing carrier, is the airline that sells 
tickets for seats on the operating carrier’s plane.  A product is defined as a combination of itinerary, ticketing 
carrier, and operating carrier(s) for all segments of the trip. We only focus on products with the same ticketing 
carrier for all trip segments, but operating carriers may differ across trip segments. 
We classify characteristics of a travel itinerary for each direction of air travel on the itinerary into the 
following categories: (1) Pure Online; (2) Traditional Codeshare Type I; (3) Traditional Codeshare Type II; 
and (4) Virtual Codeshare.  Table 1 provides examples of these categories for an itinerary that uses two 
segments (i.e. requires one intermediate stop) for the given direction16 of air travel being classified.  We 
independently classify each direction of air travel on a given itinerary, and therefore the classification category 
for the going (or outbound) segment(s) of the trip may be different from the classification category on the 
coming back (or inbound) segment(s) of the trip. 
                                                                
15  See OST-2008-0252 – Public Version Comments of the Department of Justice. Document can be downloaded at: 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/comments/253575.htm. 
16 Direction of air travel here means either going to the destination or coming back from the destination. 
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The segment(s) of an itinerary that the passenger uses for travel in a given direction is defined as pure 
online if the same carrier serves as both the operating and ticketing carrier for all segments of the itinerary.  
For the example in the table, Delta Airlines (DL) is the ticking carrier for the first and second segments of the 
trip, denoted by DL: DL.  Moreover, Delta is also the operating carrier for these two segments.  
The segment(s) of an itinerary that the passenger uses for travel in a given direction is defined as 
codeshare when operating carrier(s) differ from ticketing carrier.  Codeshare itineraries may either be 
Traditional Type I; Traditional Type II; or Virtual.  The segments of air travel in a given direction on an 
itinerary are classified as Traditional Type I if operating carriers across the segments differ, and the ticketing 
carrier is one of the distinct operating carriers, but Traditional Type II if the ticketing carrier is not one of the 
distinct operating carriers.  Table 1 shows carrier information for a given direction of air travel on an itinerary 
that is Traditional Type I since the operating carriers are Sabena Belgian World Airlines (SN) and Austrian 
Airlines (OS), and the ticketing carrier is Sabena Belgian World Airlines.  The table also shows that the 
classification would instead be Traditional Type II if the ticketing carrier is Delta Airlines (DL) rather than 
Sabena Belgian World Airlines.  
Last, the segment(s) of an itinerary for a given direction of air travel is (are) classified as virtual 
codeshare if the segment(s) use(s) the same operating carrier, but the ticketing carrier is different.  The virtual 
codeshare example in the table indicates that Delta is the ticking carrier, but Sabena Belgian World Airlines 
operates on all segments of the trip. 
 
Table 1 
Examples of Itinerary Categories for a given Direction of Air 
Travel  
Itinerary Category  Ticking Carrier Operating Carriers 
Pure Online DL:DL DL:DL 
Traditional Type I SN:SN SN:OS 
Traditional Type II DL:DL SN:OS 
Virtual  DL:DL SN:SN 
 
3.2 Data 
The source of data used in our study is the International Passenger Airline Origin and Destination 
Survey (DB1B) collected by the Office of Airline Information of the Bureau of Transportation Statistics.  The 
database comes from a quarterly survey of ten percent of the passengers traveling through at least one route 
segment that is flown by a U.S. carrier.  Since each ticket in the data needs at least one segment  
operated by a US carrier, then the representativeness of this dataset varies across markets due to the missing 
part relating to services provided by only non-US airlines.  Each observation represents an itinerary that was 
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purchased at a specific price by a given number of passengers during a quarter.  Information provided by 
each observation includes: (1) the number of passengers paying the given fare during the quarter; (2) mileage 
flown for each itinerary segment; (3) numeric codes identifying each airport, city, and country on the itinerary; 
and (4) identity of operating and ticketing carriers on the itinerary.  In addition, turnaround points in the 
itinerary can be identified by the trip break code.  The trip break code is useful for identifying the origin and 
destination. 
We compiled two separate data samples from the database.  One sample, which we refer to as the 
“oneworld Event Sample”, is compiled specifically for studying market effects associated with 
implementation of the oneworld alliance.  The “oneworld Event Sample” covers periods before and after 
implementation of the oneworld alliance.  As we previously stated, the oneworld alliance was officially 
launched and started its operation on February 1, 1999.  The pre-alliance periods in the “oneworld Event 
Sample” are quarters 1 and 2 of 1998, while the post-alliance periods are quarters 1 and 2 of 2001.  The reason 
we use quarters 1 and 2 of 2001 as the post-alliance periods is to avoid capturing the impacts that the terrorist 
attack of 9-11 had on air travel, which would confound identifying the pure effects of implementing the 
oneworld alliance. 
The other data sample, which we refer to as the “ATI Event Sample”, is compiled specifically for 
studying market effects associated with the granting of ATI to various members of the oneworld alliance.  The 
“ATI Event Sample” covers periods before and after ATI was granted.  As we previously stated, on August 
14, 2008, five members of the oneworld alliance jointly applied for ATI, but it was not until July 20, 2010 that 
the DOT issued a final order of approval for ATI.  The pre-ATI periods in the “ATI Event Sample” are quarters 
2 and 3 of 2008, while the post-ATI periods are quarters 2 and 3 of 2011. 
Note that American Airlines, British Airways, Cathay Pacific, and Qantas are founders of oneworld 
alliance, but Iberia and Finnair entered the alliance in the same year of alliance formation, and LAN joined 
the alliance in year 2000.  Therefore, we only consider these seven airlines as oneworld alliance members in 
the “oneworld Event Sample”.  In the “ATI Event Sample”, American Airlines, British Airways, Iberia, 
Finnair, and Royal Jordanian are the oneworld members that were granted ATI.   
It is important to note that the names we use to label these data samples do not imply that the only 
airlines in each sample are members of the oneworld alliance.  The name given to a data sample purely relates 
to the event that the data sample is used to study.  Therefore, each sample comprises a wide array of airlines.  
There are 65 ticketing carriers in the “oneworld Event Sample”, while the “ATI Event Sample” contains 72 
ticketing carriers.  Table A3 and Table A4 in Appendix A list all the ticketing carriers in each data sample 
respectively. 
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We apply several restrictions to “clean” the raw data.  First, observations in which itineraries have 
more than 8 coupons are eliminated.  Second, we only keep observations with roundtrip itineraries, so the 
starting and ending airports are the same.  Third, itineraries that are cheaper than $100 or more expensive than 
$10,000 are deleted.  Fourth, origin airports must be located in the 48 main land states of the U.S., while 
destination airports are located in other countries.  However, itineraries with origin airport outside the U.S. 
and destination airport within the U.S. are not included because it is difficult to collect demographic data (e.g. 
population size) for cities of origin airports located outside the United States.  We need data on population 
size in origin cities in order to measure potential market size and to compute observed product shares in our 
study.  
The data that remain after applying the restrictions above do have repeated observations of products 
that have different prices and numbers of passengers within each quarter.  During each quarter we compute 
the average price and aggregate the number of passengers associated with unique products (itinerary-airline(s) 
combination), then collapse the data in each quarter by only keeping unique products. In the end, we have 
164,908 products (observations) across 55,641 markets in the collapsed “oneworld Event Sample”, and 
333,450 products across 84,740 markets in the collapsed “ATI Event Sample”.  
In the “oneworld Event Sample” and the “ATI Event Sample”, there are respectively 142 and 181 
destination countries across six world continents.  Table 2 and Table 3 respectively list destination countries 
in each dataset for which the percent of products that have the country as a destination is at least 1 percent.  In 
the “oneworld Event Sample”, among 142 destination countries, only 26 of them are destinations for a 
sufficiently large number of itineraries that satisfy the “at least 1 percent of products” threshold.  However, 
the percent of products in the “oneworld Event Sample” with air travel to these 26 countries is almost 80 
percent.  In the “ATI Event Sample” there are only 21 destination countries out of 181 that satisfy the “at least 
1 percent of products” threshold, but the percent of products in this sample with air travel to these 21 countries 
is around 72 percent. 
Based on the collapsed datasets, we create additional variables needed in our study.  These variables 
are constructed to capture various non-price characteristics of air travel products.  The reader will observe in 
subsequent sections of the paper that our model of demand and short-run supply requires data on product 













 countries  
Percent of 
products offered 
Canada 15.34 Hong Kong 1.41 
Mexico 13.18 Philippines 1.38 
United Kingdom 6.40 Switzerland 1.38 
Germany 6.12 Dominican Republic 1.24 
France 5.01 Netherlands Antilles 1.21 
Bahamas 3.27 Australia 1.18 
Japan 3.17 Cayman Islands 1.15 
Italy 2.54 South Korea 1.07 
Netherlands 2.01 Aruba 1.03 
Brazil 1.86 Belgium 1.03 
Jamaica 1.84 India 1.03 
Spain 1.72 Thailand 1 
Costa Rica 1.48 Others 20.50 













Mexico 13.16 Costa Rica 1.62 
Canada 12.53 Brazil 1.62 
United Kingdom 6.52 Netherlands 1.55 
Germany 5.47 Ireland 1.49 
Italy 4.22 India 1.30 
France 3.65 Switzerland 1.19 
Bahamas 2.89 Aruba 1.15 
Spain 2.88 South Korea 1.07 
China 2.52 Australia 1.04 
Dominican Republic 2.13 Other countries 27.96 
Japan 2.06 Total 100 
Jamaica 1.98    
 
As in Gayle and Thomas (2016), we define origin presence variables from two different perspectives.  
The variable Opres_demand is a count of the number of different airports to which the airline has nonstop 
flights leaving from the relevant origin airport for which variable Opres_demand is being used to measure the 
size of the airline's presence.  On the other hand, Opres_cost counts the number of airports within the United 
States from which the airline provides nonstop flights going to the relevant origin airport for which Opres_cost 
is being used to measure the size of the airline's presence.  Effectively, Opres_demand is measured from the 
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perspective of an airline's distinct "outbound" activities from an origin airport of a market, while Opres_cost 
is measured from the perspective of an airline's "inbound" activities to the origin airport of a market.17 
Opres_demand is constructed to help explain variations in demand across carriers for the products 
offered to consumers at the consumers’ origin airport, i.e., this variable helps explain consumers' choice 
between airlines at the consumer's origin airport.  The presumption here is that a consumer is more likely to 
choose the airline that offers nonstop service to more cities from the consumer's origin airport.  On the other 
hand, Opres_cost is intended to help capture airlines’ cost effects.  The idea is that the larger is an airline’s 
Opres_cost measure at the origin of a market, the larger the volume of passengers the airline is likely to channel 
through the market and therefore the airline is expected to have lower marginal cost of transporting a passenger 
in this market due to economies of passenger-traffic density. 
Nonstop_going and Nonstop_coming are dummy variables we construct to equal to 1 if the product 
uses nonstop itinerary for departing and returning legs of the trip, respectively.  The variables Distance_going 
and Distance_coming respectively measure the market miles flown between origin and destination for 
departing and returning trips.  
 Routing_quality_going (Routing_quality_coming) is a variable that constitutes a flying distance-based 
measure of routing quality, or "directness" of routing, on the going (coming) portion of the product itinerary.  
It is computed as the minimum flying distance going to (coming from) the destination airport in the origin-
destination market as a percentage of the actual flying distance on the going (coming) portion of the itinerary 
for the product for which the routing quality is being measured.  If Routing_quality_going 
(Routing_quality_coming) takes on the maximum value of 100, then in terms of flying distance this is the 
most travel-convenient routing offered in the market for the going (coming) portion of the trip.18 
 Observed product share, Sj, is computed by dividing quantity of product 𝑗  sold by origin city 
population, i.e. 𝑆𝑗 =
𝑞𝑗
𝑃𝑂𝑃⁄ .
19  The population data are obtained from the population estimates of United 
States Census Bureau. 
                                                                
17 As discussed in Gayle and Thomas (2016), an airline’s inbound and outbound nonstop service activities at an airport need not be 
symmetrical in terms of the number and/or identity of endpoint cities from which its inbound flights come compared to the number 
and/or identity of endpoint cities to which it provides nonstop outbound service.  A reason for the potential asymmetry is that the 
plane used to provide inbound nonstop service to the relevant airport for a subset of passengers on the plane, may not contain 
nonstop passengers for the outbound service from the relevant airport to possibly a different city.  As such, while variables 
Opres_demand and Opres_cost are likely positively correlated, they need not be perfectly correlated. 
18 See Chen and Gayle (2018) for a detailed discussion of this distance-based measure of routing quality. 
19 Due to the fact that population magnitudes are significantly larger than quantity sold for any given air travel product, observed 
product shares, computed as described above,  are extremely small numbers.  We therefore scale up all product shares in the data by 
a common factor.  The common factor is the largest integer such that the outside good share (𝑆0 = 1 − ∑ 𝑆𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1 ) in each market 
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To properly identify codeshare products, we appropriately recode the feeder/regional airlines to their 
matching major airlines since we only consider codesharing between major carriers.  For example, SkyWest 
(OO) operates on a regional airline level, and feeds passengers to United Airlines (UA), US Airways (US), 
and Delta Airlines (DL).   Therefore, SkyWest needs to be recoded to take the code of the major airline to 
which it feeds passengers for the itinerary under consideration. We do this recoding to all operating carriers 
that are feeder, regional, or subsidiary airlines for each coupon in the datasets.  Even though this is a tedious 
process that takes time, doing so lets us accurately identify codeshare products between major carriers.  The 
summary statistics of above-mentioned variables are shown in Table 4.  We use the consumer price index with 




Summary Statistics  
Variables 
“oneworld Event Sample” “ATI Event Sample” 
Mean Std. Dev Min Max Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Farea 1,025.298 1043.988 110.003 11,997.06 1,094.031 1,012.379 86.240 8,992.601 
Quantity (qj) 6.495 38.496 1 3,210 5.401 38.477 1 3,279 
Opres_demand 25.007 33.258 0 186 30.482 45.248 0 261 
Opres_cost 25.002 28.861 0 143 26.354 33.908 0 172 
Nonstop_going 0.047 0.212 0 1 0.041 0.199 0 1 
Nonstop _coming 0.049 0.215 0 1 0.039 0.195 0 1 
Distance _going 4,016.996 2,462.371 96 16,619 4,121.875 2,455.821 96 17,801 
Distance _coming 4019.531 2,465.869 96 13,933 4,126.352 2,458.620 96 17,457 
Routing_quality_going 94.398 8.808 42.634 100 94.076 9.086 39.362 100 
Routing_quality_ coming 94.350 8.878 35.616 100 93.962 9.205 35.859 100 
Traditional_I_going 0.157 0.364 0 1 0.173 0.378 0 1 
Traditional_II_going 1.88E-04 0.014 0 1 0.003 0.054 0 1 
Traditional_I_coming 0.156 0.363 0 1 0.175 0.380 0 1 
Traditional_II_coming 3.58E-04 0.019 0 1 0.003 0.057 0 1 
Virtual_going 0.015 0.123 0 1 0.019 0.137 0 1 
Virtual_coming 0.016 0.126 0 1 0.022 0.147 0 1 
Observed Product Shares (Sj) 0.003 0.012 
2.27E-
05 0.924 0.001 0.004 
7.52E-
06 0.437 
Number of products 164,908    333,450    
Number of markets 55,641    84,740    





                                                                
remains positive. The common factor that satisfies these conditions is 183 in the “oneworld Event Sample” and 62 in the “ATI Event 
Sample”. 
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3.3 Results from a Reduced-form Price Regression 
To help motivate the need for our subsequent structural econometric model, we now examine price 
effects associated with: (i) various features of airline markets and air travel products; (ii) implementation of 
the oneworld alliance; and (iii) the grant of ATI to various members of the oneworld alliance.  Price effects 
are identified within a reduced-form price regression framework.  One attractive feature of a reduced-form 
price regression is that its specification and estimation do not require the strong assumptions on optimizing 
behavior of market participants as are required for specification and estimation of a structural model.  However, 
unlike a structural model, a reduced-form price regression cannot separately identify changes in markup versus 
changes in marginal cost, which are two key distinct aggregate components of equilibrium price.  
Understanding how various market and product features influence markup and marginal cost is crucial for 
understanding the economic mechanisms through which these features impact prices.     
Table 5 presents the estimation results of a reduced-form price regression.  In both the “oneworld Event 
Sample” and “ATI Event Sample”, the coefficient estimate on Opres_cost is positive, but the coefficient 
estimate on Opres_cost_square is negative.  This sign pattern of these coefficient estimates suggests that an 
airline's size of presence at the origin airport has a positive price effect at relatively low levels of its airport 
presence, but a negative price effect at relatively high levels of its presence at the origin airport.  One can 
reasonably argue that these estimated price effects are likely driven by the impacts an airline's size of presence 
at the origin airport has on its marginal cost.  Specifically, once an airline’s airport presence increases beyond 
a certain threshold, then the airline is better able to exploit economies of passenger-traffic density, causing 
downward pressure on its marginal cost, which in turn causes downward pressure on its fares.  This is an 
example in which we need the structural model to properly disentangle the sources (markup versus cost) of 
key driving forces of the estimated price effects.  
The coefficient estimates on the nonstop variables suggest that products that require flying nonstop 
between the origin and destination tend to have relatively higher fares.  The higher fares associated with 
nonstop products can be due to these products having higher markup, higher marginal cost, or a combination 
of both.  Estimation results from the structural model will shed more light on markup and marginal cost reasons 
why nonstop products tend to have relatively higher fares.  
Coefficient estimates on the routing quality variables suggest that products with more travel-
convenient routing, as measured by the product's flying distance relative to the minimum flying distance 
needed, tend to have relatively higher fares.  These results are consistent with the argument that a more travel-
convenient itinerary is associated with higher passenger utility, a demand result that can explicitly be tested 
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within the structural demand model framework we subsequently specify and estimate.   
As expected, the estimated coefficients on the flying distance variables suggest that longer itinerary 
distances are associated with higher product price.  This result makes sense since it is likely that itinerary 
flying distance is positively related to marginal cost.  
 
Table 5 
Reduced-form Price Equation Estimation 
  “oneworld Event Sample” “ATI Event Sample” 
Variables 
Coefficient 
Estimates Std. Error 
Coefficient 
Estimates Std. Error 
Opres_cost 3.016*** 0.414 3.655*** 0.229 
Opres_cost_square -0.004 0.003 -0.014*** 0.002 
Nonstop_going 59.601*** 15.896 17.501 11.082 
Nonstop_coming 0.681 15.208 22.503* 11.534 
Routing quality_going 1.398** 0.607 1.372*** 0.357 
Routing_quality_coming 2.287*** 0.604 1.315*** 0.351 
Distance_going 0.056*** 0.022 0.044*** 0.013 
Distance_coming 0.094*** 0.022 0.033*** 0.013 
Close_comp_going 0.319 0.921 -0.351 0.322 
Close_comp_coming -0.921 0.920 -0.084 0.322 
Traditional_I_going 6.279 14.464 39.772*** 8.949 
Traditional_II_going 672.564** 330.111 -24.579 44.212 
Traditional_I_coming 40.065*** 13.798 87.016*** 8.736 
Traditional_II_coming 171.489 157.115 34.892 41.630 
Virtual_going -8.901 22.225 -1.901 14.676 
Virtual_coming 62.332*** 22.954 103.286*** 14.848 
Tpost−Event -152.044*** 6.051 15.362*** 4.439 
Event_Members 13.503 89.004 17.887 44.852 
Tpost−Event × Event_Members 24.817** 11.037 -29.351*** 10.686 
Market_Overlap_ATI_carriers - - -10.241** 4.615 
Tpost−Event × Event_Members
× Market_Overlap_ATI_carriers - - 13.295 10.520 
Constant 1447.753*** 511.662 528.932*** 168.787 
Operating carrier group fixed 
effects YES YES 
Season fixed effect YES YES 
Market Origin fixed effect YES YES 
Market Destination fixed effect YES YES 
         
R-squared 0.2365 0.2786 
   Notes: Equations estimated using ordinary least squares. *** statistically significant at 1%;  
** statistically significant at 5%; and * statistically significant at 10% 
 
For the given product under consideration, the variables Close_comp_going and Close_comp_coming 
measure the number of competing products offered by other carriers with equivalent number of intermediate 
stops on the departing and returning portions of the trip respectively.  We expect that the measure of each of 
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these variables for a given product is positively correlated with the level of competition this product faces 
in the market.  However, there is no evidence in the reduced-form price regression that these variables 
influence price. 
The coefficient estimates on the zero-one codeshare dummy variables provide a comparison with 
respect to pure online products.  The reduced-form price regression results reveal that these coefficient 
estimates are positive whenever they are statistically significant, suggesting that codeshare itineraries are 
associated with higher price relative to pure online itineraries.  At this point it is not clear whether the relatively 
higher price of codeshare itineraries is driven by relatively higher markup or higher marginal cost.   
𝑇𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡−𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 is a time period zero-one dummy variable that equals 1 only during time periods after 
occurrence of the relevant event under consideration, where the event is either the implementation of the 
oneworld alliance, or the grant of ATI to various members of the oneworld alliance; and 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 is a 
zero-one airline dummy variable that equals 1 when the airline is a direct member of the event being analyzed.  
In the “oneworld Event Sample” the coefficient estimate on 𝑇𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡−𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 is negative and statistically significant, 
suggesting that across the pre-post periods of implementation of the oneworld alliance, carriers that are not 
members of this alliance, on average, decreased the price of their products.  Interestingly, the coefficient 
estimate on 𝑇𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡−𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 × 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠 is positive and statistically significant, but in absolute terms the 
coefficient estimate on 𝑇𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡−𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 is larger.  As such, across the pre-post periods of implementation of the 
oneworld alliance, members of this alliance, on average, also decreased the price of their products, but by a 
smaller magnitude compared to other carriers.  This evidence of differential changes in price for oneworld 
alliance members compared to other carriers suggests that implementation of the alliance is not associated 
with partner carriers charging lower prices, and may even have led to partner carriers' prices being higher than 
would otherwise be, a result that is contrary to findings in Brueckner, Lee and Singer (2011).   
In the “ATI Event Sample" we include the dummy variable 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡_𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑎𝑝_𝐴𝑇𝐼_𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑠, which 
equals to 1 for markets in which there exists substitute products that are both ticketed and operated by at least 
two distinct ATI carrier members, i.e., markets in which the ATI members’ service overlap.  First, the 
coefficient estimate on 𝑇𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡−𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that prices charged by 
carriers other than oneworld ATI members, on average, increased over the pre-post periods of granting ATI 
to some oneworld members.  However, the coefficient estimate on  𝑇𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡−𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 × 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟   is 
negative, statistically significant, and in absolute terms larger than the coefficient estimate on 𝑇𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡−𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡.   As 
such, the evidence suggests that in markets where oneworld ATI members’ services did not overlap, prices 
charged by these ATI members decreased over the pre-post periods of granting them ATI.  Furthermore, since 
the coefficient estimate on 𝑇𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡−𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 × 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 × 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡_𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑎𝑝_𝐴𝑇𝐼_𝑡𝑘𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑠  is 
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statistically insignificant, there is no evidence that granting ATI resulted in these carriers raising their price 
in their overlap markets.  Therefore, the evidence suggests that granting Antitrust Immunity brought benefits 
to consumers in terms of lower fares, a result that is consistent with findings in Brueckner, Lee and Singer 
(2011) and much of the previous literature on the price effects ATI. 
We now turn to specifying the structural econometric model used for decomposing the estimated price 
effects discussed above into demand effects, markup effects, and cost effects.  The subsequent structural 
econometric analyses enable readers to better understand the economic market forces associated with alliance 
implementation with and without granting ATI.  
 
4.  Model 
4.1 Demand 
We model air travel demand using a random coefficients logit model. 20  Suppose in a market there are 
J differentiated air travel products, j = 1,…,J, and one outside good/option, j = 0, e.g. driving, taking a train, 
or not traveling at all.  Products may be purchased by POP potential consumers.  Each potential consumer, 
indexed by c, chooses the travel option that gives him the highest utility, that is, we assume each potential 





𝑝𝑝𝑗 + 𝜉𝑗 + 𝜀𝑐𝑗
𝑑 } (1) 
where 𝑈𝑐𝑗 is the value of travel option j to consumer c; 𝑥𝑗 is a vector of non-price characteristics of product j; 
𝜙𝑐
𝑥 is a vector of consumer-specific marginal utilities (assumed to vary randomly across consumers) associated 
with non-price characteristics in 𝑥𝑗 ;  𝑝𝑗 is the price the consumer must pay to obtain product j; 𝜙𝑐
𝑝
 is the 
consumer-specific marginal utility of price, which is assumed to vary randomly across consumers; 𝜉𝑗capture 
product characteristics that are observed by consumers and airlines, but not observed by us the researchers; 
and 𝜀𝑐𝑗
𝑑  is a mean-zero random component of utility. 

















































































































                                                                
20 See Peters (2006) and Berry and Jia (2010) for similar modeling approach of air travel demand with the exception that 
these papers use a nested logit model. 
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where 𝜙𝑝 is the mean (across consumers) marginal utility of price;  𝜙𝑥 is a vector of mean marginal utilities 
for respective non-price product characteristics; 𝜙𝐼 = (𝜙𝑝
𝐼 , 𝜙1
𝐼 , … , 𝜙𝐿
𝐼 ) is a set of parameters that measure 
consumer income-induced taste variation for respective product characteristics; 𝐼𝑐 is a variable that measures 
consumer income, which has a mean of zero across consumers since this variable measures the deviation of 
consumer c's income from the mean income of consumers in the relevant market;  𝜙𝑣 = (𝜙𝑝
𝑣, 𝜙1
𝑣 , … , 𝜙𝐿
𝑣) is a 
set of parameters that measure variation across consumers in random taste shocks for respective product 
characteristics; and  𝑣𝑐 = (𝑣𝑐𝑝, 𝑣𝑐1, … , 𝑣𝑐𝐿) is a set of consumer c's random taste shocks for respective product 
characteristics.  We assume that 𝑣𝑐 follows a standard normal probability distribution across consumers. 
We follow much of the literature on discrete choice demand model and assume that 𝜀𝑐𝑗
𝑑  in equation (1) 
is governed by an independent and identically distributed extreme value probability density[see Nevo (2000)].  
As such, the probability that product j is chosen, or equivalently the predicted market share of product j is:   
 𝑠𝑗(𝑥𝑗 , 𝑝𝑗,𝜉𝑗; 𝜙
𝑥 , 𝜙𝑝, 𝜙𝐼 , 𝜙𝑣) = ∫
exp(𝛿𝑗 + 𝜇𝑐𝑗)




where 𝛿𝑗 = 𝑥𝑗𝜙
𝑥 + 𝜙𝑝𝑝𝑗 + 𝜉𝑗 is the mean utility obtained across consumers who choose product j; 𝜇𝑐𝑗 =
𝜙𝑝




𝑣𝑝𝑗𝑣𝑐𝑝 + ∑ 𝜙𝑙
𝑣𝑥𝑗𝑙𝑣𝑐𝑙
𝐿
𝑙=1  is a consumer-specific deviation from the mean utility 
level; ?̂?(∙) is the empirical distribution of consumer incomes in the market; and 𝐺(∙) is the standard normal 
distribution function for the taste shocks.  Since there is no closed-form solution for the integral in equation 
(3), this integral is approximated numerically using random draws from ?̂?(𝐼) and 𝐺(𝑣). 21  
We further attempt to disentangle 𝜉𝑗 into two components, Υ𝑗 and ∆𝜉𝑗, where Υ𝑗 is a component that 
captures the extent to which consumers’ product choice behavior is influenced by cooperative agreements 
(Alliance and ATI) between airlines, and ∆𝜉𝑗 is a composite of product characteristics that are observed by 
consumers and airlines, but not observed by us the researchers.  In particular, we specify that 𝜉𝑗 = Υ𝑗 + ∆𝜉𝑗, 
where   
Υ𝑗 = 𝛾1𝑇𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡−𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝛾2𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 + 𝛾3𝑇𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡−𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 × 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟.   (4) 
As previously defined, 𝑇𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡−𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 is a time period zero-one dummy variable that equals 1 only during time 
periods after occurrence of the relevant event under consideration, where the event is either the implementation 
of the oneworld alliance, or the grant of ATI to various members of the oneworld alliance; and 
𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 is a zero-one airline dummy variable that equals 1 when the airline is a direct member of the 
event being analyzed.  Substituting for 𝜉𝑗 and Υ𝑗 in the mean utility function yields the following expression 
                                                                
21 We use 200 random draws from ?̂?(𝐼) and 𝐺(𝑣) for the numerical approximation of  𝑠𝑗(∙). 
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for the mean utility function: 
                     δ𝑗     =    𝑥𝑗𝜙
𝑥      +      𝜙𝑝𝑝𝑗   +   𝛾1𝑇𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡−𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡   +   𝛾2𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟  +
                                                      𝛾3𝑇𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡−𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 × 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 + ∆𝜉𝑗                                    (5) 
  Key parameters of interest in equation (5) are: 𝛾1, 𝛾2 and 𝛾3.  𝛾1 measures the extent to which mean 
utility changes across pre-post event periods for products offered by airlines that are not direct members of 
the event.  𝛾2 measures whether products offered by event members yield persistently different mean utility 
to consumers, irrespective of the event, compared to the mean utility yielded from products offered by other 
airlines.  Last, across the pre-post event periods, 𝛾3 measures the difference in changes of the mean utility 
obtained from consuming products offered by event members relative to products offered by other airlines.  
Therefore, 𝛾3 captures how the event differentially influences mean utility, and consequently demand for event 
members’ products. 
The demand, 𝑑𝑗, for product j is simply given by:  
     𝑑𝑗 = 𝑠𝑗(𝑝, 𝑥, ∆𝜉; Φ
d) × 𝑃𝑂𝑃,                                        (6) 
where POP is a measure of market size, which we assume to be the total number of potential consumers 
(measured by population) in the origin city, and  𝑠𝑗(𝑝, 𝑥, ∆𝜉; Φ
d) is the predicted product share function given 
in equation(3).  Φd = (𝜙𝑝, 𝜙𝑥, 𝛾1, 𝛾2, 𝛾3, 𝜙
𝐼 , 𝜙𝑣) is the vector of demand parameters to be estimated. 
 
4.2 Supply 
Codeshare agreements commonly require that the ticketing carrier markets and sets the final price for 
the round-trip ticket and compensates the operating carrier for operating services provided.  However, partner 
airlines do not publicize what mechanism they use for compensating each other for transportation services 
provided on codeshare products.  Furthermore, agreed upon compensation mechanisms may even vary across 
partners.  Therefore, the challenge we face as researchers is to specify a modeling approach that captures our 
basic understanding of what is commonly known about how a codeshare agreement works without imposing 
too much structure on a contracting process about which we have few facts.   
We follow Chen and Gayle (2007), Gayle (2013) and Gayle and Thomas (2016) and specify a 
codeshare agreement as a privately negotiated pricing contract between partners (𝑤, Γ), where 𝑤 is a per-
passenger price the ticketing carrier pays over to an operating carrier for transporting the passenger, while Γ 
represents a potential lump-sum transfer between partners that determines how the joint surplus of a codeshare 
product is distributed.  For the purpose of this paper, we do not need to econometrically identify an equilibrium 
value of Γ.  However, in describing the dynamic part of the model, we do show where Γ enters the model. 
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Suppose that the final price of a codeshare product is determined within a sequential price-setting 
game.  In the first stage of the sequential process the operating carrier sets price for transporting a passenger, 
𝑤, and privately makes this price known to its partner ticketing carrier.  In the second stage, given the price 𝑤 
that will be paid to the operating carrier, the ticketing carrier sets the final round-trip price 𝑝  for the codeshare 
product.  The final subgame in this sequential price-setting game is played between ticketing carriers, and 
yields the final ticket prices observed by consumers. 
Let each airline/ticketing carrier offer a set 𝐵𝑖𝑚𝑡 of products for sale to consumers in market m during 





[∑ (𝑝𝑗𝑚𝑡 − 𝑚𝑐𝑗𝑚𝑡)𝑞𝑗𝑚𝑡𝑗∈𝐵𝑖𝑚𝑡 ],                           (7) 
where 𝑉𝑃𝑖𝑚𝑡 is the variable profit carrier 𝑖 obtains in market m during period t, and 𝑝𝑗𝑚𝑡, 𝑞𝑗𝑚𝑡, and 𝑚𝑐𝑗𝑚𝑡 
represent, respectively, price, quantity sold, and effective marginal cost of product j in market m during period 
t. 
Let 𝑓 = 1, … , 𝐹  index the corresponding operating carriers and 𝑂𝑗  the set of operating carriers, 
excluding the ticketing carrier, that use their own planes to transport consumers of product j.  If product 𝑗 is a 
traditional codeshare product, then 𝑚𝑐𝑗𝑚𝑡 = 𝑐𝑗𝑚𝑡
𝑖 + ∑ 𝑤𝑗𝑚𝑡
𝑓
𝑓∈𝑂𝑗 , where 𝑐𝑗𝑚𝑡
𝑖  is the marginal cost that ticketing 
carrier 𝑖 incurs by using its own plane to transport passengers on some segment(s) of the trip needed for 
product 𝑗 , while 𝑤𝑗𝑚𝑡
𝑓
 is the price ticketing carrier 𝑖 pays to operating carrier 𝑓 for transportation services 
carrier f provides on a subset of the remaining trip segment(s).  If ticketing carrier i does not provide any 
transportation service to traditional codeshare product j, then 𝑐𝑗𝑚𝑡
𝑖 = 0 .  If instead product 𝑗 is a virtual 




 is the price the ticketing carrier pays to operating carrier 
𝑓 for its exclusive transportation services in the provision of product 𝑗.22  Last, if product 𝑗 is a pure online 
product, then 𝑚𝑐𝑗𝑚𝑡 = 𝑐𝑗𝑚𝑡
𝑖 .  In the case of a pure online product, the ticketing carrier is also the sole operating 
carrier of product 𝑗, i.e., 𝑖 = 𝑓. 
Note that 𝑐𝑗𝑚𝑡
𝑖  is the per-passenger expenses directly incurred by ticketing carrier 𝑖 when it uses its 
own plane(s) to transport passengers on a subset of the trip segments of product 𝑗, while 𝑤𝑗𝑚𝑡
𝑓
 is positively 
correlated with per-passenger expenses incurred by operating carrier 𝑓 when it contributes operating services 
to product 𝑗.  In the first stage of the sequential price-setting game, operating carriers each optimally choose 
                                                                
22 We implicitly assume here that the ticketing carrier of a virtual codeshare product only incurs fixed expenses in marketing the 












𝑓 )𝑞𝑗𝑚𝑡𝑗∈𝐴𝑓 ] , where 𝐴𝑓  is the set of products in the market to which carrier 𝑓 
contributes its transportation services, while 𝑐𝑗𝑚𝑡
𝑓
 is the marginal cost that carrier 𝑓 incurs by using its own 
plane to provide transportation services to product 𝑗.  In equilibrium, the profit maximizing choice of 𝑤𝑗𝑚𝑡
𝑓
 








  are a function of factors that influence the marginal cost of operating carriers. As such, when we 
subsequently specify a parametric marginal cost function for econometric estimation, 𝑚𝑐𝑗𝑚𝑡 will be a function 
of factors that influence the marginal cost of operating carriers. 
In equilibrium, the amount of product 𝑗 an airline sells is equal to the quantity demanded, that is, 
𝑞𝑗𝑚𝑡 = 𝑠𝑗𝑚𝑡(𝑝, 𝑥, 𝜉; Φ
d) × 𝑃𝑂𝑃.  The optimization problem in (7) yields the following set of J first-order 
conditions – one for each of the J products in the market: 
    𝑠𝑗 + ∑ (𝑝𝑘 − 𝑚𝑐𝑘)
𝜕𝑠𝑘
𝜕𝑝𝑗
𝑘∈𝐵𝑖 = 0  𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽.   (8) 
We have dropped the time and market subscripts in equation (8) only to avoid a clutter of notation.  
Using matrix notation, the system of first-order conditions in equation (8) is represented by: 
    𝑠 + (𝛺.∗ 𝛥) × (𝑝 − 𝑚𝑐) = 0,      (9) 
where s, p, and mc are J×1 vectors of predicted product shares, product prices, and marginal costs respectively.  
Ω is a J×J matrix of appropriately positioned zeros and ones that describes ticketing carriers’ ownership 
structure of the J products, where element Ω𝑗𝑘 = 1 when 𝑗 = 𝑘 or when 𝑗 ≠ 𝑘 but distinct products j and k are 
“owned” by the same ticketing carrier, otherwise element Ω𝑗𝑘 = 0.   .∗ is the operator for element-by-element 
matrix multiplication, and Δ is a J×J matrix of first-order derivatives of product market shares with respect to 
prices, where element ∆𝑗𝑘=
𝜕𝑠𝑘
𝜕𝑝𝑗
.  Because the ticketing carrier is considered the “owner” of a product, in the 
discussion that follows, “airline” is synonymous with ticketing carrier. 
 Note that the structure of matrix  effectively determines groups of products in a market that are jointly 
priced.  If distinct airlines that offer products in a market non-cooperatively set their product prices, then the 
structure of  is determined by Bi for all i in market m.  However, if subsets of these airlines have ATI, then 
ATI partners will jointly/cooperatively set prices in the market, and consequently the structure of  is based 
on product-groupings according to subsets of ATI partners rather than Bi.  During various periods in our data, 
members of SkyTeam and Star alliances have ATI, and the structure of  takes this into account.23  Of course 
                                                                
23 Carve-outs are markets in which authorities forbid joint pricing of products by ATI members.  We assume that ATI members do 
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 also takes into account that oneworld alliance members presumably non-cooperatively priced their 
products during periods before ATI was granted to them, but cooperatively priced their products after ATI is 
granted.  
Re-arranging equation (9), we can obtain a vector of product markups: 
   𝑚𝑘𝑢𝑝(𝑥, ∆𝜉; Φd) = 𝑝 − 𝑚𝑐 = −(𝛺.∗ 𝛥)−1 × 𝑠.             (10) 
Using the estimated product-level markups from equation (10), product-level marginal costs are recovered by: 
       𝑚?̂? = 𝑝 − 𝑚𝑘𝑢?̂?,      (11) 
where 𝑚?̂? is the vector of estimated marginal costs for all products. 
Finally, with the estimated markups from equation (10), firm-level variable profits can be computed 
by: 
    𝑉𝑃𝑖𝑚𝑡 = ∑ 𝑚𝑘𝑢𝑝𝑗𝑚𝑡(𝑥, ∆𝜉; Φd̂)𝑞𝑗𝑚𝑡𝑗∈𝐵𝑖𝑚𝑡 .             (12) 
 
4.3 Dynamic Entry/Exit Game 
In the dynamic entry/exit game, at the end of every period, airlines decide on the set of markets in 
which to offer products during the next period.  Airlines make such forward-looking and strategic decisions 
to maximize their expected discounted inter-temporal profits in each market: 
    𝐸𝑡(∑ 𝛽
𝑟𝛱𝑖𝑚,𝑡+𝑟
∞
𝑟=0 ),                                          (13) 
where 𝛽 ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor, and  𝛱𝑖𝑚,𝑡+𝑟 is the per-period profit of airline 𝑖 in origin-destination 
market m.  Per-period profit is equal to variable profit minus per-period fixed cost of being active in a market, 
and minus the one-time entry cost of starting to offer products in a market for the first time: 
𝛱𝑖𝑚𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖𝑚,𝑡−1𝑉𝑃𝑖𝑚𝑡 − 𝑎𝑖𝑚𝑡{𝐹𝐶𝑖𝑚𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑚𝑡
𝐹𝐶 + (1 − 𝑎𝑖𝑚,𝑡−1)[𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑚𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑚𝑡
𝐸𝐶 ]},   (14) 
where 𝑎𝑖𝑚𝑡 is a zero-one indicator variable that equals 1 only if airline i makes decision in period t to be active 
in market m during period t+1; and 𝑉𝑃𝑖𝑚𝑡 is the variable profit of airline i in origin-destination market m 
during period t that is computed from the Nash equilibrium price-setting game discussed previously. An airline 
is viewed as active in a market when it actually sells products to consumers even though a subset of those 
products may use the operating services of the airline’s partner carriers. 
𝐹𝐶𝑖𝑚𝑡 and 𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑚𝑡 are deterministic parts of the fixed cost and entry cost functions, respectively.  These 
deterministic parts of the cost functions are common knowledge for all airlines.  𝜖𝑖𝑚𝑡
𝐹𝐶  and 𝜖𝑖𝑚𝑡
𝐸𝐶  represent 
private information shocks to fixed and entry costs respectively.  The composite shock 𝜀𝑖𝑚𝑡 = 𝜖𝑖𝑚𝑡
𝐹𝐶 +
                                                                
not jointly price in carve-out markets, and therefore  takes carve-out markets into account.  
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(1 − 𝑎𝑖𝑚,𝑡−1)𝜖𝑖𝑚𝑡
𝐸𝐶  is assumed to be independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) over airlines, markets, 
and time period based on a specific probability distribution function, which we assume is the type 1 extreme 
value distribution.  
The deterministic portions of fixed and entry costs are specified as: 
 𝐹𝐶𝑖𝑚𝑡   =  𝜃0
𝐹𝐶 + 𝜃1
𝐹𝐶𝑂𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠_𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑡    + 𝜃2
𝐹𝐶𝑇𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡−𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡     + 𝜃3
𝐹𝐶𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑡    +
                                  𝜃4
𝐹𝐶𝑇𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡−𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 × 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑡                               (15) 
 𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑚𝑡  =  𝜃0
𝐸𝐶 + 𝜃1
𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠_𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑡    + 𝜃2
𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡−𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡     + 𝜃3
𝐸𝐶𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑡      +
                                𝜃4
𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡−𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 × 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑡                           (16) 
where 𝑇𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡−𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 is a time period zero-one dummy variable that equals 1 only during time periods after 
occurrence of the event, where the event is either the implementation of the oneworld alliance, or the grant of 
ATI to various members of the oneworld alliance; and 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑡 is a zero-one airline dummy 
variable that equals 1 when the airline is a member of the event being analyzed. 
The vector of parameters to be estimated in the dynamic model is as follows: 










𝐸𝐶}′,                   (17) 
where 𝜃0
𝐹𝐶  and 𝜃0
𝐸𝐶  respectively measure mean fixed and entry costs across airlines, markets and time;24 𝜃1
𝐹𝐶  
and 𝜃1
𝐸𝐶  respectively measure the effect that origin airport presence has on fixed and entry costs; 𝜃2
𝐹𝐶  and 
𝜃2
𝐸𝐶  respectively measure the extent to which fixed and entry cost change across pre-post event periods for 
airlines that are not members of the event; while 𝜃3
𝐹𝐶  and  𝜃3
𝐸𝐶  respectively measure the extent to which event 
members fixed and entry costs persistently differ from other airlines’ fixed and entry costs.  Across the pre-
post event periods, 𝜃4
𝐹𝐶  measures the difference in changes of mean fixed costs of event members relative to 
other airlines, while 𝜃4
𝐸𝐶  measures the difference in changes of mean entry costs of event members relative to 
other airlines.  Therefore, 𝜃4
𝐹𝐶  and 𝜃4
𝐸𝐶  capture how the event differentially influences mean fixed and entry 
costs respectively. 
Note that the mean recurrent fixed cost parameter 𝜃0
𝐹𝐶  may comprise fixed expenses incurred by a 
ticketing carrier when the carrier markets a codeshare product to potential consumers.  We previously stated 
that (𝑤, Γ) represents a privately negotiated codeshare contract between partner carriers, where 𝑤 is a per-
                                                                
24 We do not estimate airline-specific effects in the fixed and entry cost functions.  One reason is that adding individual airline fixed 
effects substantially increases the number of parameters to be estimated, which substantially increases computation time to estimate 
the dynamic model.  It takes about two weeks for our program to optimize the dynamic estimation even with only 10 parameters to 
be estimated in our specifications.  However, the fixed and entry cost functions do capture some heterogeneity across airlines via 
the airline-specific variable 𝑂𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠_𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑡. 
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passenger price the ticketing carrier pays over to an operating carrier for transporting the passenger, while 
Γ represents a potential lump-sum transfer between partners that determines how the joint surplus is distributed.  
Our previous discussion also shows that 𝑤 enters the effective marginal cost of the ticketing carrier.  However, 
the lump-sum transfer between partners, Γ, is nested in 𝜃0
𝐹𝐶 , but we do not attempt to separately identify Γ 
since knowing its value is not essential for the purposes of our paper. 
 
Reducing the dimensionality of the state space 
Let 
   𝑅𝑖𝑚𝑡
∗ = 𝑎𝑖𝑚,𝑡−1𝑉𝑃𝑖𝑚𝑡.       (18) 
The (x, ξ) in equation (12) are state variables that will be present in the dynamic entry/exit game.  As 
Aguirregabiria and Ho (2012) points out, 𝑅𝑖𝑚𝑡
∗  aggregates these state variables through equation (12) and (18) 
so that these state variables do not need to enter the dynamic game individually, which considerably reduces 
the dimensionality of the state space.  Therefore, following Aguirregabiria and Ho (2012), we just treat 𝑅𝑖𝑚𝑡
∗  
as a firm-specific state variable, rather than treating x and ξ separately.  
The payoff-relevant information of airline i in origin-destination market m during period t will be the 
following:  
   𝑦𝑖𝑚𝑡 ≡ {𝑎𝑖𝑚,𝑡−1, 𝑅𝑖𝑚𝑡
∗ , 𝑂𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠_𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑡 , 𝑇𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡−𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡}.    (19) 
 
Value Function and Bellman Equation 
Let 𝜎 ≡ {𝜎𝑖𝑚(𝑦𝑖𝑚𝑡, 𝜀𝑖𝑚𝑡), 𝑖 = 1,2, . . , 𝑁; 𝑚 = 1,2, … , 𝑀} be a set of strategy functions, one for each 
airline.  𝜎 is a Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) if the profile of strategies in 𝜎 maximizes the expected 
profit of airline i at each possible state (𝑦𝑖𝑚𝑡, 𝜀𝑖𝑚𝑡) given the opponent’s strategy. 
Let 𝑉𝑖
𝜎(𝑦𝑡, 𝜀𝑖𝑡) be the value function for airline i given that the other airlines behave according to their 
respective strategies in 𝜎.  The value function is the unique solution to the Bellman equation: 
        𝑉𝑖
𝜎(𝑦𝑡, 𝜀𝑖𝑡) =   Max
𝑎𝑖𝑡∈{0,1}
{𝛱𝑖𝑡
𝜎(𝑎𝑖𝑡, 𝑦𝑡) − 𝜀𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑎𝑖𝑡                                                
                          + 𝛽 ∫ 𝑉𝑖
𝜎(𝑦𝑡+1, 𝜀𝑖𝑡+1) 𝑑𝐺𝑖(𝜀𝑖𝑡+1)𝐹𝑖
𝜎(𝑦𝑡+1|𝑎𝑖𝑡,𝑦𝑡)},   (20)                         
where 𝛱𝑖𝑡
𝜎(𝑎𝑖𝑡,𝑦𝑡) and 𝐹𝑖
𝜎(𝑦𝑡+1|𝑎𝑖𝑡,𝑦𝑡) are the expected one-period profit and expected transition of state 
variables, respectively, for airline i given the strategies of the other airlines.  A MPE in this model is a set of 
strategy functions 𝜎 such that for any airline i and at every state:  
𝜎𝑖(𝑦𝑡, 𝜀𝑖𝑡) = 𝑎𝑟𝑔max
𝑎𝑖𝑡
{ 𝛱𝑖𝑡
𝜎(𝑎𝑖𝑡,𝑦𝑡) − 𝜀𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑎𝑖𝑡                                   
                              +𝛽 ∫ 𝑉𝑖
𝜎(𝑦𝑡+1, 𝜀𝑖𝑡+1) 𝑑𝐺𝑖(𝜀𝑖𝑡+1)𝐹𝑖
𝜎(𝑦𝑡+1|𝑎𝑖𝑡,𝑦𝑡)}.  (21) 
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Transition rules for state variables are described in Appendix B.  In Appendix C we illustrate that the MPE 
can also be represented as a vector of conditional choice probabilities (CCPs) that solves the fixed point 
problem 𝑷 = 𝜓(𝑷, 𝜃) , where 𝐏 = {𝑃𝑖(𝐲): for every firm and state (𝑖, 𝒚)}.  𝑷 = 𝜓(𝑷, 𝜃) is a vector of best 
response probability mapping, where 𝜓(∙) is the CDF of the type 1 extreme value distribution. 
 
5.  Estimation 
5.1 Demand Estimation 
The demand model is estimated using Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM).  Following Berry 
(1994), Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995), and Nevo (2000), we can solve for ∆𝜉𝑗 as a function of demand 
parameters and the data, where ∆𝜉𝑗 = 𝛿𝑗 − 𝑥𝑗𝜙
𝑥 − 𝛾1𝑇𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡−𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 −   𝛾2𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 − 𝛾3𝑇𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡−𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 ×





where 𝑍𝑑 is the matrix of instruments that are assumed orthogonal to the error vector ∆𝜉, while W is the 





.  Since parameters 𝜙𝑝, 𝜙𝑥, 𝛾1, 𝛾2 and 𝛾3 enter the error 
term linearly, we can restructure the GMM optimization problem in (22) such that the search to minimize the 
objective function, Δ𝜉′𝑍𝑑𝑊𝑍𝑑′Δ𝜉 , is done exclusively over parameter vector 𝜙𝐼 and 𝜙𝑣 , i.e., the GMM 
optimization problem reduces to min
𝜙𝐼,𝜙𝑣
Δ𝜉′𝑍𝑑𝑊𝑍𝑑′Δ𝜉.  Once the optimization over 𝜙𝐼 and 𝜙𝑣 is complete, we 
can recover estimates of  𝜙𝑝, 𝜙𝑥, 𝛾1, 𝛾2 and 𝛾3 .
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In using GMM to estimate the demand parameters, we take into account that 𝑝𝑗𝑚𝑡 is endogenous.  The 
endogeneity problem exists because the product price, 𝑝𝑗𝑚𝑡, is correlated with the error term Δ𝜉𝑗𝑚𝑡.  Therefore, 
an application of valid instruments is necessary.  Valid instruments should be correlated with 𝑝𝑗𝑚𝑡 , but 
uncorrelated with Δ𝜉𝑗𝑚𝑡.  
 
Instruments for endogenous variables in demand equation 
The instruments used in the demand estimation for “oneworld Event Sample” and “ATI Event Sample” 
are: (1) the number of competing products offered by other carriers with equivalent number of intermediate 
stops on the departing and returning legs of the trip respectively; (2) the interaction between jet fuel price26 
                                                                
25 For details of this estimation algorithm of a random coefficients logit model, see Nevo (2000). 
26 The jet fuel price we use is U.S. Gulf Kerosene-Type Jet Fuel Spot Price FOB from U.S. Energy Information Administration. 
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and itinerary distance for the departing and returning legs of the trip respectively; and (3) itinerary distance 
for the departing and returning legs of the trip respectively.  These instruments are similar to those used in 
Gayle (2013). 
Instrument (1) measures the degree of market competition facing a product, which affects the size of 
its price-cost markup.  The rationale for instrument (2) and (3) is due to the fact that jet fuel price and itinerary 
distance are correlated with marginal cost of providing the product, which in turn affect its price.   
Validity of the instruments rely on the fact that the menu of products offered by airlines in a market is 
predetermined at the time of shocks to demand, which implies that the instruments are uncorrelated with Δ𝜉𝑗𝑚𝑡.  
Furthermore, unlike price, the menu of products offered and their associated non-price characteristics are not 
routinely and easily changed during a short period of time, which mitigates the influence of demand shocks 
on the menu of products offered and their non-price characteristics.27    
 
5.2  Marginal Cost Function Estimation 
Our specification of the marginal cost function is as follows: 
 𝑚𝑐𝑗𝑚𝑡̂ = 𝜏0 + 𝜏1𝑊𝑗𝑚𝑡 + 𝜏2𝑇𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡−𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝜏3𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠   + 𝜏4𝑇𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡−𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 ×    𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠 +
                              𝑜𝑝𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑗  + 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 + 𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑚 + 𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚 + 𝜂𝑗𝑚𝑡,        (23) 
where the dependent variable, 𝑚𝑐𝑗𝑚𝑡̂ , is first recovered based on the Nash equilibrium price-setting game by 
subtracting estimated product markups from prices (see equations (10) and (11)); 𝑊𝑗𝑚𝑡 is a vector of variables 
that shift marginal cost; 𝑜𝑝𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑗
𝑚𝑐 is an airline-specific component of marginal cost captured by operating 
carrier group fixed effect; and 𝜂𝑗𝑚𝑡 is an unobserved component of marginal cost.  We estimate the marginal 
cost function using ordinary least squares. 
Given that 𝑇𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡−𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 is a zero-one time period dummy variable that equals 1 only during post-event 
time periods, parameter 𝜏2 , which is the coefficient on 𝑇𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡−𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 , measures how marginal cost changes 
across pre-post event periods for products offered by airlines that are not direct members of the event.  
Parameter 𝜏3 , which is the coefficient on Event_Members, measures whether products offered by event 
members have persistently different marginal cost, irrespective of the event, compared to the marginal cost of 
products offered by other airlines.  Last, across the pre-post event periods, parameter 𝜏4  measures the 
difference in changes of mean marginal costs of providing event members products relative to products 
                                                                
27 The frequency with which airlines change their menu of product offerings in a market likely differ across markets.  In principle, 
our instruments are stronger in markets where most airlines infrequently change their menu of product offerings, but weaker in 
markets where most airlines routinely change their menu of product offerings.      
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provided by other airlines.  Therefore, 𝜏4 captures how the event differentially influences marginal cost of 
event members’ products.  
 
5.3 Dynamic Model Estimation 
The datasets used for estimating the short-run demand and supply are at the product-market-time 
period level.  However, for estimating the dynamic entry/exit model, the data need to be aggregated up to the 
airline-market-time period level.  Since the datasets contain too many airlines for the dynamic model to handle, 
we need to appropriately group some airlines to make estimation of the dynamic model feasible.  For the 
“oneworld Event Sample”, some airlines are grouped resulting into the following 7 distinct entry/exit decision-
making units in the dynamic model: oneworld alliance members; Continental; Delta; Northwest; United; US 
Airways; and all other airlines.  For the “ATI Event Sample”, we have the following 6 distinct entry/exit 
decision-making units: oneworld ATI members, Continental, Delta, United, US Airways, all other airlines. 
In order to estimate the dynamic entry/exit model we need to know whether an airline is effectively 
active or not in each market.  Similar to Aguirregabiria and Ho (2012), a number-of-passengers threshold is 
used to determine activity of each airline in each market.  We define an airline to be active in an origin-
destination market during a quarter if the airline’s number of passengers in the quarter averages to at least 1 
passenger per week.28  Based on this defined market activity information, we are able to identify the markets 
that each carrier enters and exits during the quarter.  Knowing the entry and exit decisions is essential for us 
to estimate fixed and entry costs in the sense that the dynamic model is based on the assumption that potential 
entrants decide to enter a market only when the one-time entry cost is less than the expected discounted future 
stream of profits, and incumbents decide to exit the market when per-period fixed cost exceeds the per-period 
variable profit and thus the expected discounted future stream of profits are not positive. 
To estimate the dynamic model, we consider the following pseudo log likelihood function: 
 𝑄(𝜃, 𝑷) = ∑ ∑ ∑ {
𝑎𝑖𝑚𝑡𝑙𝑛 [𝜓 (?̃?𝑖𝑚𝑡
𝑃 (𝑦) × 𝜃 + ?̃?𝑖𝑚𝑡
𝑃 (𝑦))]
+(1 − 𝑎𝑖𝑚𝑡)𝑙𝑛 [𝜓 (−?̃?𝑖𝑚𝑡






𝑚=1 ,  (24) 
where the conditional choice probabilities (CCPs) in vector 𝚸, which are used for computing ?̃?𝑖𝑚𝑡
𝑃 (𝑦) and 
?̃?𝑖𝑚𝑡
𝑃 (𝑦) (see Appendix C), are arbitrary and do not represent the equilibrium probabilities associated with 𝜃 
in the model.  
                                                                
28 Aguirregabiria and Ho (2012) define the airline to be active in a market each quarter when the number of passengers is 260 or 
more in a non-directional market per quarter (20 passengers per week). 
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We apply the Nested Pseudo Likelihood (NPL) estimation algorithm discussed in Aguirregabiria 
and Ho (2012) and Aguirregabia and Mira (2002 and 2007), but we begin with the Pseudo Maximum 
Likelihood (PML) estimation procedure.  The PML estimation algorithm requires two steps.  In step 1, we 
estimate relevant state transition equations and compute nonparametric estimates of the choice probabilities 
?̂?0.  By estimating the state transition equations, we are able to construct state transition probability matrices 
𝐅𝑖𝑦
𝐏 (1) and 𝐅𝑖𝑦
𝐏 (0).  Nonparametric probability estimates are used to construct consistent estimates of ?̃?𝑖𝑚𝑡
?̂?0  and 
?̃?𝑖𝑚𝑡
 ?̂?0  as described in Appendix C.  With 𝐅𝑖𝑦
𝐏 (1)  𝐅𝑖𝑦
𝐏 (0)  ?̃?𝑖𝑚𝑡
?̂?0  and ?̃?𝑖𝑚𝑡
 ?̂?0 , we can construct the pseudo log 
likelihood function, 𝑄(𝜃, ?̂?0).  
In step 2, the vector of parameters 𝜃𝑃𝑀𝐿 is estimated by: 
  𝜃𝑃𝑀𝐿 = arg max 
𝜃
 𝑄(𝜃, ?̂?0) .                                     (25) 
Step 2 is computationally straightforward since it only involves estimation of a standard discrete choice logit 
model.  In addition, the PML algorithm does not require solving for an equilibrium in the dynamic game, 
which reduces computational burden. However, the nonparametric estimation of ?̂?0 might be inconsistent due 
to serial correlation or time invariant unobserved heterogeneity [Aguirregabiria and Ho (2012)]. In addition, 
the expected value of the nonlinear objective function of ?̂?0 is not equal to the value of the objective function 
evaluated at the expected value of ?̂?0, leading to bias of the two-step estimator 𝜃𝑃𝑀𝐿.  So we next implement 
the NPL algorithm, which is designed to reduce the bias of the two-step PML estimator. 
The NPL algorithm applies a recursive K-step extension of the PML estimation.  Since we have the 
two-step estimator 𝜃𝑃𝑀𝐿 and the initial nonparametric estimates of CCPs, ?̂?0 , we can construct new CCP 
estimates, ?̂?1, using the best response CCPs equation ?̂?1 = Ψ(?̂?0, 𝜃𝑃𝑀𝐿).  We then maximize the pseudo log 
likelihood function, where the function is constructed using ?̂?1, i.e. we solve the following problem: 𝜃2 =
arg max 
𝜃
 𝑄(𝜃, ?̂?1) .  This process is repeated K times to obtain 𝜃𝐾 = arg max 
𝜃
 𝑄(𝜃, ?̂?𝐾−1)  and ?̂?𝐾 =
Ψ(?̂?𝐾−1, 𝜃𝐾).  The algorithm comes to an end on the K
th iteration in which the choice probability vector ?̂?𝐾 is 
sufficiently close to ?̂?𝐾−1 based on a tolerance level that we chose.  To assess robustness of parameter 
convergence in our application of the NPL estimation algorithm, we have tried starting the algorithm at several 
distinct initial sets of  𝜃 and find that the NPL algorithm converged to qualitatively similar 𝜃 on each run of 
the estimation algorithm.  Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002, 2007) show that the NPL algorithm reduces the 
finite sample bias of the two-step PML estimator.   
 
6. Results from Estimation 
6.1 Results from Demand Estimation 
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Table 6A and 6B report demand estimation results for the “oneworld Event Sample” and “ATI Event 
Sample” respectively.  We begin by estimating a standard logit specification of the demand model, which is 
more restrictive than the random coefficients logit model.  Each table reports both ordinary least squares (OLS) 
and two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimates of the standard logit demand model.  As discussed previously, 
it is likely that the variable Fare (𝑝𝑗) is endogenous.  Even though the coefficient estimate on Fare has the 
expected negative sign for both OLS and 2SLS estimation of the model, the substantial difference in 
magnitude of the OLS and 2SLS coefficient estimate on Fare is evidence suggestive of Fare being endogenous.   
To formally investigate if Fare is endogenous, we implement a Hausman test.  Based on the results of 
the Hausmam test shown in each table, we easily reject that Fare is exogenous at conventional levels of 
statistical significance.  We also evaluate whether the instruments have statistically significant explanatory 
power in explaining variations in Fare.  First-stage reduced-form regressions in which Fare is the dependent 
variable yield R-squared values of 0.23 and 0.26 for the “oneworld Event Sample” and “ATI Event Sample” 
respectively.  An F-test of the joint statistical significance of the instruments in the first-stage reduced-form 
regressions yield F-statistic values of F(6, 164901) = 1429.98 and F(6, 332332) = 133.40, each with a 
corresponding p-value of 0.000 for the “oneworld Event Sample” and “ATI Event Sample” respectively. 
These results suggest that the instruments do have statistically significant explanatory power of variations in 
Fare. 
The discussion of demand results in Table 6A and Table 6B focuses on the less restrictive random 
coefficients logit model.  The upper panel of each table reports the mean marginal (dis)utilities for each 
product characteristic (𝜙𝑝 and 𝜙𝑥), while the lower panel of each table reports the parameter estimates that 
measure income-induced and random taste variations across consumers for respective product characteristics 
(𝜙𝐼 and 𝜙𝑣) .    
We find a negative coefficient estimate for variable Fare in both datasets, implying that price has a 
negative effect on consumers’ mean utility.  This is expected because, assuming all non-price product 
characteristic are held constant, passengers should prefer itineraries with a lower price.  Furthermore, a 
positive income-induced taste variation parameter estimate, which is the coefficient estimate on the interaction 
of Fare with Income, suggests the intuitively appealing result that higher income consumers display lower 
sensitivity to price changes.     
It is estimated that Opres_demand has a positive effect on consumers’ utility.  This estimated marginal 
effect is expected since travelers are likely to prefer using the airline that provides services to more destinations 
from the travelers’ origin airport.  The intuition is that the value of an airline’s frequent-flyer program (FFP) 
to residents of an origin city increases as the number of destinations to which the airline offers nonstop flight 
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leaving from the travelers’ origin airport increases, thus increasing loyalty to the airline. 
The coefficient estimates associated with Nonstop_going and Nonstop_coming are positive and 
statistically significant, implying passengers prefer flying nonstop to their destination and flying nonstop from 
their destination back to their origin.  Moreover, as expected, Routing_quality_going and 
Routing_quality_coming are estimated to have positive effects on consumers’ utility, implying that passengers 
are more likely to choose the itinerary that uses the most convenient routing in terms of travel distance covered.   
 
Table 6A 
Demand Estimation using the “oneworld Event Sample” 
Variables in the mean utility 
function: Associated 
parameters, 𝜙𝑝 and 𝜙𝑥. 
Standard Logit Model 
 


















Fare -0.026*** 0.002 -1.062*** 0.033 -2.085*** 0.216 
Opres_demand 0.002*** 0.0001 0.005*** 0.0002 0.004*** 2.73E-04 
Nonstop_going 0.707*** 0.02 0.701*** 0.024 0.768*** 0.035 
Nonstop_coming 0.631*** 0.019 0.570*** 0.023 0.688*** 0.034 
Routing_quality_going 0.990*** 0.037 1.081*** 0.052 1.126*** 0.068 
Routing_quality_coming 1.086*** 0.037 1.137*** 0.052 1.220*** 0.063 
Traditional_I_going -0.257*** 0.007 -0.243*** 0.013 -0.249*** 0.017 
Traditional_II_going -0.765*** 0.088 -0.237 0.346 -0.241 0.480 
Traditional_I_coming -0.263*** 0.007 -0.217*** 0.012 -0.212*** 0.016 
Traditional_II_coming -0.670*** 0.076 -0.636*** 0.139 -0.631*** 0.245 
Virtual_going -0.628*** 0.020 -0.647*** 0.030 -0.649*** 0.042 
Virtual_coming -0.610*** 0.019 -0.555*** 0.030 -0.656*** 0.042 
Tpost−Event -0.009* 0.005 -0.152*** 0.008 -0.162*** 0.011 
Event_Member 0.841*** 0.115 0.826*** 0.142 0.846*** 0.194 
Tpost−Event × Event_Member -0.014 0.012 0.014 0.016 0.029 0.026 
Spring (Summer) 0.035*** 0.005 0.012* 0.007 0.075*** 0.015 
Constant -9.466*** 0.163 -6.505*** 0.556 -7.219*** 1.111 
Tkcarriers fixed effects YES YES YES 
Market Origin fixed effects YES YES YES 
Market Destination fixed effects YES YES YES 
Variables that measure taste 
heterogeneity across 
Consumers: Associated 
parameters, 𝜙𝐼 and 𝜙𝑣.    
  
    
𝑣 × Constant  - - - - -1.354 244.39 
 𝑣 × Fare - - - - -8.431 66.988 
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 × Fare - - - - 0.861*** 0.094 
       
R-squared 0.610   - 
GMM Objective Function Value  
  1406.984 
Test of Endogeneity: 
Ho: Fare is Exogenous 
Robust Score Chi-sq (1) 2400.97   (P-Value = 0.0000)  
Robust regression F(1, 163938)  2580.20    (P-Value =  0.0000)  
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Notes: *** statistically significant at 1% level; ** statistically significant at 5% level; * statistically significant at 10% level.  For the Standard Logit 
Model, the well-known linear equation used for estimating the parameters is: 𝑙𝑛(𝑆𝑗) − 𝑙𝑛(𝑆0) = 𝑥𝑗𝜙
𝑥 − 𝜙𝑝𝑝𝑗 + ⋯ + 𝜉𝑗, where 𝑆𝑗  is the observed share of 
product j,  𝑆0 = 1 − ∑ 𝑆𝑗
𝐽





Demand Estimation using the “ATI Event Sample” 
Variables in the mean utility 
function: Associated 
parameters, 𝜙𝑝 and 𝜙𝑥. 
Standard Logit Model 
 















Estimates Std. Error 
Fare -0.007*** 0.001 -1.926*** 0.080 -4.169 2.846 
Opres_demand 0.001*** 0.00005 0.004*** 0.0002 0.004*** 3.088E-04 
Nonstop_going 0.832*** 0.013 0.815*** 0.023 0.853*** 0.054 
Nonstop_coming 0.850*** 0.014 0.827*** 0.024 0.852*** 0.038 
Routing_quality_going 0.655*** 0.021 0.729*** 0.042 0.742*** 0.054 
Routing_quality_coming 0.743*** 0.021 0.900*** 0.042 0.970*** 0.073 
Traditional_I_going -0.217*** 0.004 -0.084*** 0.015 -0.105*** 0.029 
Traditional_II_going -0.281*** 0.018 -0.190*** 0.067 -0.276* 0.152 
Traditional_I_coming -0.230*** 0.004 -0.020 0.016 -0.077* 0.077 
Traditional_II_coming -0.308*** 0.017 -0.145*** 0.060 -0.129 0.085 
Virtual_going -0.484*** 0.011 -0.405*** 0.029 -0.354*** 0.050 
Virtual_coming -0.479*** 0.010 -0.176*** 0.032 -0.212*** 0.055 
Tpost−Event -0.050*** 0.003 -0.050*** 0.008 0.008 0.034 
Event_Member 0.278 0.307 1.131*** 0.393 0.399 0.376 
Tpost−Event × Event_Member -0.003 0.009 -0.016 0.017 0.007 0.030 
Spring (Summer) -0.032*** 0.003 0.043*** 0.007 0.044*** 0.018 
Constant -9.578*** 0.316 -8.220*** 0.447 -5.570*** 1.759  
Tkcarriers fixed effects YES YES YES 
Market Origin fixed effects YES YES YES 
Market Destination fixed effects YES YES YES 
Variables that measure taste 
heterogeneity across 
Consumers: Associated 
parameters, 𝜙𝐼 and 𝜙𝑣.    
  
    
𝑣 × Constant  - - - - 0.052 4.618 
 𝑣 × Fare - - - - 0.718 1.248 
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 × Fare - - - - 1.109*** 0.469 
       
R-squared 0.680   - 
GMM Objective Function Value  
  220.526 
Test of Endogeneity: 
Ho: Fare is Exogenous 
Robust Score Chi-sq (1) 2831.59  (P-Value = 0.0000)  
Robust regression F(1, 332336)  3055.26   (P-Value =  0.0000)  
Notes: *** statistically significant at 1% level; ** statistically significant at 5% level; * statistically significant at 10% level.  For the Standard Logit Model, 
the well-known linear equation used for estimating the parameters is: 𝑙𝑛(𝑆𝑗) − 𝑙𝑛(𝑆0) = 𝑥𝑗𝜙
𝑥 − 𝜙𝑝𝑝𝑗 + ⋯ + 𝜉𝑗, where 𝑆𝑗  is the observed share of product j,  
𝑆0 = 1 − ∑ 𝑆𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1  is the observed share of the outside good, and 𝜉𝑗 is the error term of the equation. 
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The coefficient estimates on the codeshare dummy variables provide a comparison with respect to 
pure online products.  Across both data samples these coefficient estimates are negative when statistically 
significant, implying that consumers less prefer codeshare itineraries to pure online itineraries.  Evidently, 
consumers view pure online products to be of higher quality than codeshare products.  Since traditional 
codeshare itineraries require partner operating carriers to coordinate interline flight connections, the apparent 
relatively higher quality of pure online itineraries may in part be driven by any given airline being better able 
to organize its own flights to streamline connection schedules and arrange gates to reduce layover time.  In 
other words, even though traditional codeshare partners try to organize and coordinate their gates and flight 
schedules, the estimates suggest that they do not perform as well as pure online providers.  In case of the 
comparison between pure online and virtual codeshare itineraries, the apparent relatively higher perceived 
quality of pure online itineraries may in part be due to a rationale posited by Ito and Lee (2007).  They argue 
that passengers perceive a virtual codeshare product as an inferior substitute to an otherwise equivalent pure 
online product since frequent-flyer programs often do not allow upgrade of a virtual codeshare ticket to first 
class. 
For the “oneworld Event Sample”, the coefficient estimate on  𝑇𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡−𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 is negative and statistically 
significant, but the coefficient estimate on 𝑇𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡−𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 × 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 is not statistically significant at 
conventional levels of statistical significance.  These coefficient estimates therefore suggest that, on average, 
there is a decline in demand for products provided by all carriers during periods subsequent to implementation 
of the oneworld alliance relative to periods prior.  Furthermore, over the pre-post alliance implementation 
periods, the decline in demand experienced by oneworld alliance members was not systematically different 
than the decline in demand experienced by other airlines.  As such, we do not find evidence that formation of 
the oneworld alliance systematically influenced demand for the alliance members' products.   
In the “ATI Event Sample”, the coefficient estimates on 𝑇𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡−𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡   and 𝑇𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡−𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 ×
𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟  are not statistically significant at conventional levels of statistical significance.  These 
coefficient estimates therefore suggest that demand for products provided by all carriers did not systematically 
change over the pre-post periods of granting ATI to some oneworld members.  As such, we do not find 
evidence that granting ATI to some oneworld members systematically influenced demand for the ATI 
members' products.  
The mean own-price elasticity estimates that the demand model yields are -2.12 in the “oneworld Event 
Sample” and -3.66 in the “ATI Event Sample”.  Own-price elasticity estimates from our model are in the 
“ballpark” and consistent with estimates from other airline industry studies.  For example, Oum, Gillen and 
Noble (1986) and Brander and Zhang (1990) find own-price elasticity in the airline industry ranging from -
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1.2 to -2.0, Berry and Jia (2010) find own-price elasticity estimates ranging from -1.89 to -2.10 in their year 
2006 sample, while Peters (2006) study of the airline industry produces own-price elasticity estimates ranging 
from -3.2 to -3.6.29  
 
6.2 Computed Markups and Variable Profits 
Information with regards to marginal costs, prices, markups, and variable profits may allow for 
drawing useful inference on market competitiveness.  Based on equation (10), combined with demand 
parameter estimates shown in Table 6A and Table 6B respectively, product markups can be computed and then 
marginal costs consequently recovered by subtracting markups from prices.  
Recall that all monetary variables in both datasets are measured with respect to year 2005 constant 
dollars.  The mean prices are $1,025.30 and $1,094.03 in the “oneworld Event Sample” and “ATI Event 
Sample” respectively, while mean product markups are $486.35 and $278.89 respectively. 30  The relatively 
lower markup in the “ATI Event Sample” is not surprising since demand is more elastic in the “ATI Event 
Sample” than in the “oneworld Event Sample”.  The Lerner Index, which is the ratio of product markup to 
price, is a well-known measure of market power.  The overall mean Lerner Indexes are 72.88% in the 
“oneworld Event Sample” and 37.71% in the “ATI Event Sample”.  
As previously discussed, to facilitate studying two distinct events that occurred during separate periods 
of time, the two data samples cover very different time periods - the “oneworld Event Sample” comprises data 
in years 1998 and 2001, while the “ATI Event Sample” comprises data in years 2008 and 2011.  As such, 
various market conditions may differ across these distinct time periods, which may explain the contrast in 
demand elasticity, and airlines' markup behavior across the two data samples, i.e., in more recent years 
apparently consumers are relatively more price sensitive and airlines have relatively less market power.  
Interestingly, the structural model plays an important role in revealing these market changes even though mean 
                                                                
29 For comparative purposes it is worth pointing out that the standard logit version of our demand model generates own price 
elasticity estimates of -1.09 in the “oneworld Event Sample” and -2.11 in the “ATI Event Sample”.  These own price elasticity 
estimates, reported in Table A5 in Appendix A, are consistently lower than those generated by our random coefficients logit demand 
model, and among the lower end of what other researchers have estimated in the literature. 
30 For comparative purposes it is worth pointing out that the standard logit version of our demand model generates mean product 
markups of $952.71 in the “oneworld Event Sample” and $521.47 in the “ATI Event Sample”.  These product markup estimates, 
reported in Table A5 in Appendix A, are consistently and substantially higher than those generated by our random coefficients logit 
demand model. The substantially higher product markups generated from the standard logit model are driven by the relatively low 
demand elasticity estimates associated with the standard logit model. As further shown in Table A5 in Appendix A, the higher 
product markups associated with the standard logit model results in higher variable profits.  Inaccurate estimates of variable profits 
will distort results from the dynamic entry/exit model.    
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prices did not change much over time.       
We implement a counterfactual experiment in which the markups are re-calculated based on the 
assumption that ATI was not granted to the oneworld members, i.e., members cannot cooperatively price their 
products in a given market.  The counterfactual experiment focuses on the markets where ATI carrier members 
each sell substitute products, i.e., markets in which air travel services they sell overlap.  Comparing actual 
markups in the post-ATI period to the counterfactual ones, we find that the mean markup of products offered 
by the ATI members would only be 0.15% lower if cooperative pricing among the members were forbidden.  
Such small changes in markups make us believe that the approval of ATI for the oneworld members has not 
resulted in significant competitive harm. 
The quarterly market-level variable profits of each airline can be computed using equation (12).  Since 
variable profit is a state variable in our dynamic entry/exit model, it is essential to have variation of this 
variable.  We find that product markups do not vary much across airlines, but we do have cross-airline 
variation in market-level variable profits.  The sources of the cross-airline variation in variable profits are the 
cross-airline variation in number of passengers per product, as well as cross-airline variation in number of 
products sold per market.  The overall mean quarterly airline market-level variable profit is $19,648.82 in the 
“oneworld Event Sample”, and $31,752.06 in the “ATI Event Sample”, and the overall median variable profits 
are $7,158.19 and $11,755.13 in the “oneworld Event Sample” and “ATI Event Sample” respectively. 
It is useful at this point to put in context the magnitudes of quarterly market-level variable profit 
estimates.  Recall that the original database, before any cleaning, is only a 10% sample of air travel tickets 
sold.  This implies that the magnitudes of variable profit estimates are at most roughly 10% of actual variable 
profits. 
 
6.3 Results from Markup function and Marginal Cost function Estimation 
Table 7 presents the OLS estimates of an equation in which we regress computed product markups on 
various determinants of product markup.  The coefficient estimate on Opres_demand has the expected positive 
sign with statistical significance.  A rationale for this estimated effect is that an airline usually has greater 
market power at its hub airport where it typically has large presence.  
For both datasets, it is estimated that the nonstop dummy variables are associated with higher markups, 
which is what we expect because consumers prefer nonstop flight to get to their destination and back, and 
therefore are willing to pay higher price for this itinerary travel convenience.  When the coefficient estimates 
on the routing quality variables are statistically significant, the estimated effect of routing quality on markup 
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is positive as expected.  These results largely suggest that airlines are more likely to charge higher markups 
when itineraries use more convenient routing for passengers in terms of miles flown relative to the possible 
minimum flight miles needed.  
As previously defined, Close_comp_going and Close_comp_coming measure the number of 
competing products offered by other carriers with equivalent number of intermediate stops for the departing 
and returning legs of the trip respectively.  We find that only Close_comp_coming has a statistically significant 
coefficient estimate for the “ATI Event Sample”.  The estimated negative effect on markup is consistent with 
expectation because these variables measure the level of market competition a product faces, i.e., products 
that face more competition will have relatively lower markup, ceteris paribus.  
 
Table 7 
 Markup Function Estimation 
  “oneworld Event Sample” “ATI Event Sample” 
Variable 
Coefficient 
Estimates Std. Error 
Coefficient 
Estimates Std. Error 
Opres_demand 0.105*** 0.003 0.069*** 0.002 
Nonstop_going 7.388*** 0.806 1.794*** 0.564 
Nonstop_coming 7.191*** 0.788 1.743*** 0.595 
Routing_quality_going 0.020** 0.009 0.022** 0.009 
Routing_quality_coming 0.004 0.009 0.029*** 0.009 
Close_comp_going -0.033 0.024 -0.006 0.016 
Close_comp_coming -0.036 0.025 -0.034** 0.016 
Traditional_1_going -1.047*** 0.140 2.700*** 0.307 
Traditional_2_going -2.055* 1.09 0.545 1.362 
Traditional_1_coming -0.567*** 0.135 3.786*** 0.292 
Traditional_2_coming -2.137** 0.840 4.150*** 1.355 
Virtual_going -5.261*** 0.394 0.049 0.643 
Virtual_coming -4.951*** 0.388 5.456*** 0.798 
Tpost−Event 1.094*** 0.093 0.077 0.171 
Event_Member -3.954* 2.253 10.864* 6.588 
Tpost−Event × Event_Member -0.485 0.459 -0.372 0.324 
Market_Overlap_ATI_tkcarriers - - 2.726*** 0.556 
Tpost−Event × Event_Member
× Market_Overlap_ATI_tkcarriers - - -1.395* 0.840 
Constant 483.678*** 2.992 261.914*** 7.725 
Ticketing carriers fixed effects YES YES 
Season/Quarter effect YES YES 
Market Origin fixed effect YES YES 
Market Destination fixed effect YES YES 
          
R-squared 0.1612 0.2038 
                 Notes: *** statistically significant at 1% level; ** statistically significant at 5% level;  
* statistically significant at 10% level.   
 
Examining the effect of codeshare on markups, we notice that the coefficient estimates of these 
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variables in Table 7 are surprisingly different across the two samples: negative in the “oneworld Event 
Sample”, but positive in the “ATI Event Sample”.  The results suggest that, compared to markups charged on 
pure online products, airlines charge relatively lower markups for codeshare products in years 1998 and 2001, 
but charge relatively higher markups for codeshare products in years 2008 and 2011.  Since on average 
consumers less prefer codeshare products to pure online products, this suggests airlines are likely to charge 
relatively lower markups on codeshare products, which is consistent with the negative coefficient estimates 
on the codeshare variables in the “oneworld Event Sample”.  However, in the case of traditional codeshare 
products, at least two distinct partner carriers are involved in pricing this type of product, and as Gayle (2013) 
argues and shows evidence of, even when the partner carriers jointly price the codeshare product optimally, 
double markups may not be eliminated resulting in these products having higher markups than pure online 
products. The positive coefficient estimates on the traditional codeshare variables in the “ATI Event Sample” 
are consistent with arguments and results in Gayle (2013).  It is more difficult to rationalize the positive 
coefficient estimates on the virtual codeshare variables for the “ATI Event Sample”.    
The coefficient estimate on interaction variable 𝑇𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡−𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 × 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟  is not statistically 
significant in the “oneworld Event Sample”, suggesting that the implementation of oneworld alliance did not 
influence market power of the oneworld members.  In the “ATI Event Sample”, we include the dummy 
variable 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡_𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑎𝑝_𝐴𝑇𝐼_𝑡𝑘𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑠, which equals to 1 for markets in which at least two ATI carrier 
members each sell substitute products, i.e., markets in which air travel services sold by ATI members overlap.  
First, the coefficient estimate on 𝑇𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡−𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 is statistically insignificant, suggesting that markups charged by 
carriers other than oneworld ATI members did not change over the pre-post periods of granting ATI to some 
oneworld members.  In addition, the coefficient estimate on  𝑇𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡−𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 × 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟   is also 
statistically insignificant, suggesting that in markets where air travel services sold by oneworld ATI members 
did not overlap, markups charged by oneworld ATI members did not change over the pre-post periods of 
granting them ATI.  The coefficient estimate on the three-way interaction variable 𝑇𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡−𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 ×
𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 × 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡_𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑎𝑝_𝐴𝑇𝐼_𝑡𝑘𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑠 is negative, but only statistically significant at the 10 
percent level.  Therefore, there is no evidence that granting ATI to oneworld members caused oneworld 
members to increase markups in markets where air travel services they sell overlap. 
Table 8 provides estimation results for the marginal cost regression based on equation (23).  The 
variable Opres_cost has a positive coefficient estimate in both samples, while the coefficient estimate on 
Opres_cost_square is negative but only statistically significant in the “ATI Event Sample”.   Such sign pattern 
of these two size-of-presence variables indicates that the size of an airline’s origin airport presence has a 
positive marginal effect on the airline's marginal cost at relatively low levels of its origin airport presence, but 
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a negative marginal effect on the airline’s marginal cost at relatively high levels of its origin airport 
presence.  This result suggests that cost efficiency gains due to economy of passenger-traffic density can only 
be achieved when the size of an airline’s airport presence surpasses a certain level.  Because an increase in an 
airline’s origin airport presence facilitates the airline channeling more of its passengers through these airports, 
we believe that economy of passenger-traffic density is a key driver of the estimated impacts on marginal cost 
of the size-of-presence variables.  The evidence we find suggesting the presence of economy of passenger-
traffic density is consistent with findings in Brueckner and Spiller (1994). 
 
Table 8 
Marginal Cost Function Estimation 







Estimates Std. Error 
Opres_cost 2.765*** 0.413 3.537*** 0.221 
Opres_cost_square -0.002 0.003 -0.014*** 0.002 
Nonstop_going 58.599*** 14.125 25.895*** 9.444 
Nonstop_coming 10.368 13.579 26.730*** 9.924 
Distance_going 0.060*** 0.013 0.038*** 0.007 
Distance_coming 0.082*** 0.013 0.026*** 0.007 
Traditional_I_going 5.186 14.435 39.040*** 8.602 
Traditional_II_going 667.082** 329.366 -22.456 42.740 
Traditional_I_coming 39.611*** 13.774 83.826*** 8.384 
Traditional_II_coming 175.439 157.028 32.607 39.961 
Virtual_going -4.917 22.167 -0.491 14.147 
Virtual_coming 68.440*** 22.876 99.793*** 14.315 
Tpost−Event -154.566*** 6.014 13.859*** 4.292 
Event_Members 3.916 91.901 13.485 40.959 
Tpost−Event × Event_Members 23.512** 11.043 -19.859** 8.078 
Constant 1417.599*** 510.342 598.926*** 161.759 
Operating carrier group fixed 
effects YES YES 
Season/Quarter effect YES YES 
Market Origin fixed effect YES YES 
Market Destination fixed effect YES YES 
          
R-squared 0.2370 0.2773 
Notes: Equations estimated using ordinary least squares. *** statistically significant at 1%;   
**   statistically significant at 5%. 
 
The coefficient estimates suggest that the nonstop product characteristic of travel itineraries positively 
affects marginal cost of providing the air travel product.  It is possible that the relatively higher marginal cost 
for nonstop itineraries is in part driven by the fact that products with intermediate stop(s) are better able to 
exploit economies of passenger-traffic density, especially when an intermediate stop is at a carrier’s hub 
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airport. 
As expected, the coefficient estimates on flying distance variables are positive and statistically 
significant.  The estimated positive marginal effects of flying distance on marginal cost may simply be 
capturing the fact that covering longer distances require more fuel. 
In both the “oneworld Event Sample” and the “ATI Event Sample”, codeshare variables are either 
positively correlated with, or not related to, marginal cost.  In other words, relative to pure online itineraries, 
codeshare itineraries seem more costly for the airlines to provide.  A possible reason for the higher marginal 
cost is that airlines that offer traditional codeshare products find it costly to coordinate schedules and gates for 
connecting flights with their codeshare partners.  The evidence apparently suggests that there also exists some 
costly coordination between operating and ticketing carriers when offering virtual codeshare products. 
In the “oneworld Event Sample” the coefficient estimate on 𝑇𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡−𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 is negative and statistically 
significant, suggesting that across the pre-post periods of implementation of the oneworld alliance, carriers 
that are not members of this alliance experienced a decrease in marginal cost of providing their products.  
Interestingly, the coefficient estimate on 𝑇𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡−𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 × 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠  is positive and statistically 
significant, but in absolute terms the coefficient estimate on 𝑇𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡−𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 is larger.  As such, across the pre-post 
periods of implementation of the oneworld alliance, members of this alliance also experienced a decrease in 
marginal cost of providing their products, but the magnitude of the decrease is smaller than what was 
experienced by other carriers.  This evidence of differential changes in marginal cost for oneworld alliance 
members compared to other carriers suggests that implementation of the alliance is not associated with 
marginal cost efficiencies for the partner carriers, and may even have generated marginal cost inefficiencies 
for the partner carriers.   
In contrast to marginal cost effects findings associated with implementation of the oneworld alliance, 
coefficient estimates in the “ATI Event Sample” suggest that granting some oneworld members ATI is 
associated with marginal cost efficiency gains for these ATI members.  Specifically, in the “ATI Event Sample” 
the coefficient estimate on 𝑇𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡−𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that across the pre-
post periods of granting ATI to some oneworld members, carriers that are not members of this ATI group 
experienced an increase in marginal cost of providing their products.  However, the coefficient estimate on 
𝑇𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡−𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 × 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠 is negative and statistically significant, and in absolute terms is larger than 
the coefficient estimate on 𝑇𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡−𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡.  As such, across the pre-post periods of granting ATI to some oneworld 
members, these ATI members experienced a decrease in marginal cost of providing their products, which is in 
contrast to the increase in marginal cost experienced by other carriers.  In their joint application for ATI, the 
oneworld members did suggest that the greater network integration and cooperation that ATI permits will 
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result in efficiency gains.  We therefore find evidence in support of these arguments. 
Our results are consistent with the finding of Oum, Park, Kim, and Yu (2004) that airlines tend to enjoy 
higher productivity gains and profitability when they form alliances at high-level cooperation than when 
alliances are at low-level cooperation.  This implies that there might be no productivity gains when the 
cooperation is too low.  Oneworld alliance without ATI involves less cooperation among the members than 
oneworld alliance with ATI in the sense that, without ATI, members are not allowed to jointly set prices and 
share revenues.  
In summary, this study has useful findings for policymakers in terms of effects on marginal costs, 
markups, and prices of alliance implementation with and without ATI.  The evidence suggests that 
implementation of the oneworld alliance without ATI did not yield cost efficiencies for the members.  However, 
the subsequent grant of ATI to various members of the oneworld alliance is associated with cost efficiency 
gains for the oneworld ATI members, perhaps owing to the greater network integration and cooperation that 
ATI permits.  Importantly, there is no evidence that granting ATI caused ATI members to increase markups or 
prices in markets where services they sell overlap.  In fact, as revealed in the reduced-form price regression 
results reported in Table 5, the evidence is consistent with the granting of ATI causing ATI members to 
decrease their prices in markets where their services did not overlap.  
 
6.4 Results from the Dynamic Model 
Table 9 and Table 10 report our recurrent fixed and market entry cost estimation results for the 
“oneworld Event Sample” and the “ATI Event Sample” respectively.  The quarterly discount factor, β, is fixed 
at 0.99, which implies an annual discount factor of 0.96.  All the estimated fixed and entry cost parameters 
are measured in ten thousands of annual 2005 dollars. 
We begin by discussing the fixed cost results and then turn to discussing the entry cost results for both 
samples.  The parameter estimates in the fixed cost functions for “oneworld Even Sample” are unreasonably 
small and not precisely estimated.  As such, we cannot draw reliable inferences about size of fixed cost in this 
data sample.  However, we find statistical significance among fixed cost parameter estimates in the “ATI Event 
Sample”.  As such, our discussion of fixed cost parameter estimates focus on the statistically significant 
parameter estimates.    
The mean fixed cost across all carriers is $7,282 in the “ATI Event Sample”.  Based on our Nash 
equilibrium price-setting game previously discussed, the overall mean quarterly variable profits in a 
directional origin-destination market is estimated to be $31,752.06 in the “ATI Event Sample”.  As a result, it 
takes airlines slightly less than one fourth of a quarter of variable profits to pay for their quarterly market fixed 
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cost. 
ATI is a zero-one dummy variable that equals to 1 only if the carrier is a oneworld ATI member.  The 
positive fixed cost coefficient estimate on this variable suggests that mean fixed cost for oneworld ATI 
members is persistently higher than the mean fixed cost of other airlines. 
 
Table 9 
Estimates of Parameters in Fixed and Entry Cost Functions 
 for the “oneworld Event Sample”  
 Parameter Estimates 
(In ten thousand $) Std. Error 
 
T-stat 
Fixed Cost Function    
Mean fixed cost across all carriers 0.0014 0.043 0.0329 
𝑂𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠_𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑡 -1.57E-06 0.0003 -0.0046 
𝑇𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡−𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 -0.0012 0.0519 -0.0229 
𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 0.0005 0.0595 0.0081 
𝑇𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 × Alliance -0.0005 0.1014 -0.0047 
    
Entry Cost Function    
Mean entry cost across all carriers 4.2187*** 0.0529 79.6977 
𝑂𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠_𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑡 -0.0078*** 0.0004 -17.6321 
𝑇𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 0.0421 0.0674 0.6246 
𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 Member -0.7123*** 0.0778 -9.1512 
𝑇𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 × Alliance -0.0989 0.1344 -0.7354 




Estimates of Parameters in Fixed and Entry Cost Functions  
for the “ATI Event Sample” 
 Parameter Estimates 
(In ten thousand $) Std. Error 
 
T-stat 
Fixed Cost Function    
Mean fixed cost across all carriers 0.7282*** 0.0305 23.8515 
𝑂𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠_𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑡 -0.0042*** 2.03E-04 -20.839 
𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐼 0.0369 0.0340 1.0837 
𝐴𝑇𝐼 0.1089** 0.0471 2.3102 
𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐼 × ATI -0.1458* 0.0815 -1.79 
    
Entry Cost Function    
Mean entry cost across all carriers 3.4021*** 0.0387 87.8913 
𝑂𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠_𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑡 -0.0037*** 2.91E-04 -12.6037 
𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐼 0.6319*** 0.0556 11.3635 
𝐴𝑇𝐼 -0.3003** 0.0665 -4.5159 
𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐼 × ATI 0.0703 0.1283 0.5479 
  Notes: *** statistically significant at 1%; ** statistically significant at 5%; * statistically significant at 10%. 
 
The fixed cost coefficient estimate on variable 𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐼 in Table 10 measures the extent to which fixed 
costs of carriers other than oneworld ATI members change over the pre and post-ATI periods.  This coefficient 
estimate is statistically insignificant, suggesting that fixed cost of carriers other than oneworld ATI members, 
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on average, did not change over the pre-post periods of granting ATI to some oneworld members.  However, 
the fixed cost coefficient estimate on interaction variable 𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐼 × 𝐴𝑇𝐼   is negative, which suggests that 
granting oneworld members ATI reduced these airlines quarterly fixed cost in the origin-destination markets 
they serve.  Therefore, there is evidence of fixed cost efficiency gains associated with the grant of immunity.   
Finding evidence of fixed cost efficiency gains is not trivial since such gains ultimately results in 
higher profits for ATI partner carriers than would otherwise be the case.  An implication of fixed cost 
efficiency gains being associated with the grant of immunity is that the governmental policy decision to grant 
alliance carriers immunity may result in an unintended consequence of providing an opportunity for some less 
efficient carriers to sustain operations in markets that they might have exited had it not been for the grant of 
immunity.  As such, the grant of immunity can have medium to long run consequences for market structure.31    
We now turn to discussing results for the entry cost functions.  All variables that enter the entry cost 
functions are the same as in the fixed cost functions.  The mean entry cost across all carriers is $42,187 in the 
“oneworld Event Sample” and $34,021 in the “ATI Event Sample”.  The overall mean quarterly variable 
profits in a directional origin-destination market are estimated to be $19,648.82 in the “oneworld Event 
Sample” and $31,752.06 in the “ATI Event Sample”.  As such, in the “oneworld Event Sample” it takes 
airlines about two quarters of variable profits to recoup their one-time sunk market entry cost investment, 
while in the “ATI Event Sample” it takes airlines just over one quarter of variable profits to recoup their one-
time sunk market entry cost investment. 
The variable 𝑂𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠_𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑡  measures the size of an airline’s presence at the origin airport of the 
market based on the number of other U.S. domestic airports from which the airline has nonstop flight going 
to the origin airport.  The entry cost function coefficient estimate on 𝑂𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠_𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑡 in Table 9 and Table 10 
are both negative and statistically significant, suggesting that an airline’s entry cost to a market declines the 
larger is the airline’s presence at the origin airport of the market.  This result is consistent with how the 
literature believes airline markets work [see Berry (1992); Goolsbee and Syverson (2008); Gayle and Wu 
(2014) among others]. 
The coefficient estimates on variables 𝑇𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 and 𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐼 in the entry cost functions respectively 
measure how market entry costs of non-oneworld alliance and non-oneworld ATI member airlines change 
between pre-post alliance and pre-post ATI periods, respectively.  Coefficient estimates on these time dummy 
variables suggest that non-oneworld alliance airlines’ market entry cost did not change between the pre and 
                                                                
31 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this market structure implication of the empirical results.  
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post-alliance periods, while the entry cost of non-oneworld ATI airlines increased by $6,319 in the post-ATI 
period relative to pre-ATI period.  
Lastly, we are interested in knowing how forming oneworld alliance and granting of ATI affect the 
entry costs of alliance members and ATI members, respectively.  The coefficient estimates on  𝑇𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 ×
𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒   and 𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐼 × 𝐴𝑇𝐼 are not statistically significant, suggesting that neither the implementation of 
oneworld alliance in year 1999, nor the subsequent grant of antitrust immunity to some members in year 2010, 
had a statistically discernible impact on the members’ market entry costs.  
In summary, we did not find any statistically discernible evidence that implementation of the oneworld 
alliance in year 1999 influenced members recurrent fixed or market entry costs, but our model reveals evidence 
that the subsequent grant of ATI in year 2010 to some oneworld members is associated with fixed cost 
efficiency gains, but no evidence of market entry cost changes for these ATI members.   
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
As airline alliance members increasingly seek to achieve greater cooperation and consolidation of their 
networks, granting antitrust immunity to alliance members has become a controversial issue and raises much 
concern in policy making.  For example, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) expressed concerns 
that the grant of antitrust immunity will reduce competition in markets where the member carriers each offer 
substitute service (their overlap markets).  Furthermore, the DOJ takes the position that immunity is not 
required for an alliance to yield benefits to consumers and partner carriers.  On the contrary, the United States 
Department of Transportation (DOT) takes the position that there are sufficient efficiency gains associated 
with granting carriers antitrust immunity such that, on net, consumers would ultimately benefit.   
Even though the literature on the price effects of granting airlines antitrust immunity is extensive, 
immunity’s separate impacts on partner carriers’ cost and markup have received little analysis.  However, to 
better evaluate the opposing policy positions taken on granting immunity, it is necessary to disentangle the 
cost effects from the markup effects.  This paper uses a structural econometric model to empirically investigate 
the impacts of implementation of an international airline alliance, and the subsequent grant of antitrust 
immunity on price, markup, and various measures of cost. 
One of our key findings of interest to policymakers is that implementation of the oneworld alliance 
did not have a statistically significant impact on markup of products offered by the alliance members, and 
there is no evidence that the subsequent grant of ATI to various members resulted in higher markups on their 
products.  Furthermore, our empirical results suggest that implementation of the oneworld alliance did not 
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yield marginal cost efficiencies, but the subsequent grant of ATI to various oneworld members facilitated 
them generating marginal cost efficiencies.  The reduction in marginal costs of oneworld ATI members puts 
downward pressure on prices in the short-run.  In particular, the grant of ATI to various members is associated 
with a decline in their price in markets where their services do not overlap.  Furthermore, the evidence suggest 
that prices did not increase in markets where their services do overlap.  These findings provide better support 
for the DOT’s policy position than they do for the DOJ’s policy position. 
In addition, results from the dynamic entry/exit part of the model did not produce any statistically 
discernible evidence that implementation of the oneworld alliance in year 1999 influenced members recurrent 
fixed or market entry costs, but reveals evidence that the subsequent grant of ATI in year 2010 to some 
oneworld members is associated with fixed cost efficiency gains, but no evidence of market entry cost changes 
for these ATI members.  Finding evidence of fixed cost efficiency gains is not trivial since such gains 
ultimately results in higher profits for ATI partner carriers than would otherwise be the case.  An implication 
of fixed cost efficiency gains being associated with the grant of immunity is that the governmental policy 
decision to grant alliance carriers immunity may result in an unintended consequence of providing an 
opportunity for some less efficient carriers to sustain operations in markets that they might have exited had it 
not been for the grant of immunity.  As such, the grant of immunity can have medium to long run consequences 
for market structure.  
Since firms typically can adjust their prices in the short term, while cost changes are typically linked 
to medium and longer term adjustments that includes seamless route network integration across partner 
carriers, then a reasonable hypothesis is that the impacts of ATI should more quickly be reflected in prices 
compared to costs.  Given the relatively short post-event time span of our data, this may in part explain why 
we did not find any evidence of market entry cost effects.  To properly explore appropriate lag effects of ATI 
requires a more extensive time span of the data, which would increase the size of the data sample and 
significantly challenge feasibility of estimating the structural model we use.  However, investigation of 
appropriate lag effects of ATI is a fruitful topic for future research.   
In summary, evidence from evaluating the oneworld alliance suggests that the grant of antitrust 

















Year  carrier joined 
the alliance 
Air Berlin AB 2012 
American Airlines AA Founder(1999) 
British Airways BA Founder(1999) 
Cathay Pacific CX Founder(1999) 
Finnair AY 1999 
Iberia IB 1999 
Japan Airlines JL 2007 
LAN LA 2000 
Qantas QF Founder(1999) 
Royal Jordanian RJ 2007 
S7 Airlines S7 2010 
Mexicana MX 2009 
 
Table A2 
Timeline of  Antitrust Immunity by U.S. Carriers 
U.S. Carriers ATI partners Active time period Carve-out 3  
Aloha Hawaiian 9/2002 - 5/2007   
America West Royal Jordanian 1/2005 - 5/2007   
American Canadian International 7/1996 - 6/20071 
New York-Toronto 
 
  LAN 9/1999 - present Miami-Santiago  
  Swissair 5/2000 - 11/2001 Chicago-Brussels  
  Sabena 5/2000 - 3/2002 Chicago-Zurich  
  Finnair 7/2002 - present   
  Swiss International Air Lines 11/2002 - 8/2005  
  SN Brussels 4/2004 - 10/2009 
 
 
  LAN and LAN-Peru* 10/2005 -present Miami-Lima  
  
British Airways, Iberia, Finnair 
and Royal Jordanian* 
7/2010 - present 
  
  Japan Airlines 11/2010 -present   
Delta Austrian Airlines, Sabena and 
Swissair 
6/1996 -5/20072 Atlanta-Zurich, Atlanta-Brussels, 
Cincinnati-Zurich, New York-
Brussels, New York-Vienna, New 
York-Geneva and New York-Zurich 
 
  
Air France, Alitalia, Czech 
Airlines 
1/2002 - present Atlanta-Paris and Cincinnati-Paris 
 
  
Korean Air Lines, Air France, 
Alitalia and Czech Airlines* 
6/2002 - present 
  
  Virgin Blue Group 6/2011   
Delta and Northwest Air France, KLM, Alitalia, 
Czech Airlines* 
5/2008 - present Atlanta-Paris and Cincinnati-Paris 
carve-outs removed 
 
*indicates an expansion of previous ATI decisions. 
1. Although not officially closed until 2007, this alliance ended on June 1, 1996. 
2. Although not officially closed until 2007, this alliance ended on August, 6, 2000. 




Timeline of  Antitrust Immunity by U.S. Carriers 
U.S. Carriers ATI partners Active time period Carve-out  
Northwest KLM 1/1993   
  KLM and Alitalia* 12/1999 -10/2001  
United 
Lufthansa 5/1996 Chicago-Frankfurt and 
Washington D.C.-Frankfurt 
 





















British Midland, Austrian Airlines, 
Lufthansa and SAS*, 4 
9/2007 - present 
 
 




Lufthansa, SAS, Austrian,  British 
Midland, LOT, Swiss International 
Air Lines, TAP and Air Canada* 




Brussels, Lufthansa, SAS, Austrian,  
British Midland, LOT, Swiss 
International Air Lines, TAP and Air 
Canada* 
7/2009 - present 
 
 
  ANA 11/2010 - present 
 
 

































List of Ticking Carriers in “oneworld Event Sample” 
Airline Name Code Airline Name Code Airline Name Code 
American Airlines Inc. AA Hawaiian Airlines Inc. HA Qantas Airways Ltd. QF 
Air Canada AC America West Airlines Inc. HP Reno Air Inc.  QQ 
Compagnie Nat'l Air France AF Iberia Air Lines Of Spain IB Varig S. A. RG 
Aeromexico AM Midway Airlines JI Alia-(The) Royal Jordanian RJ 
Aloha Air Cargo AQ TAM Airlines  JJ South African Airways SA 
Alaska Airlines Inc. AS Japan Air Lines Co. Ltd. JL Scandinavian Airlines Sys. SK 
Royal Air Maroc AT Air Jamaica Limited JM Sunworld International Airlines SM 
Finnair Oy AY Aero California  JR Sabena Belgian World Air. SN 
Alitalia AZ Korean Air Lines Co. Ltd. KE Swissair Transport Co. Ltd. SR 
British Airways Plc BA Klm Royal Dutch Airlines KL Sun Country Airlines  SY 
Eva Airways Corporation BR Lan-Chile Airlines.  LA Taca International Airlines TA 
Caribbean Airlines Limited BW Lufthansa German Airlines LH Thai Airways International Ltd. TG 
Air China CA Polskie Linie Lotnicze LO Turk Hava Yollari A.O. TK 
China Airlines Ltd. CI Lacsa LR Tap-Portuguese Airlines TP 
Continental Air Lines Inc. CO Malev Hungarian Airlines MA Transbrasil S.A. TR 
Canadian Airlines CP China Eastern Airlines MU Trans World Airways LLC TW 
Continental Micronesia CS Compania Mexicana De Aviaci MX ATA Airlines d/b/a ATA TZ 
China Southern Airlines CZ Northwest Airlines Inc. NW United Air Lines Inc. UA 
Delta Air Lines Inc. DL Air New Zealand NZ US Airways Inc. US 
Tower Air Inc. FF Czech Airlines OK Aeropostal Alas De Venezuel VH 
AirTran Airways Corporation FL Austrian Airlines OS Republic Airlines YX 




































List of Ticketing Carriers in “ATI Event Sample” 
Airline Name Code Airline Name Code Airline Name Code 
LAN Argentina 4M Aer Lingus Plc EI Air New Zealand NZ 
Jet Airways (India) Limited 9W Emirates EK Olympic Airlines OA 
Aegean Airlines A3 Etihad Airways EY Czech Airlines OK 
American Airlines Inc. AA Frontier Airlines Inc. F9 Austrian Airlines OS 
Air Berlin PLC and CO AB Icelandair FI Asiana Airlines Inc. OZ 
Air Canada AC AirTran Airways Corporation FL Qantas Airways Ltd. QF 
Compagnie Nat'l Air France AF Gulf Air Company GF Qatar Airways  QR 
Aeromexico AM Hawaiian Airlines Inc. HA Alia-(The) Royal Jordanian RJ 
Aeromexpress AP Iberia Air Lines Of Spain IB South African Airways SA 
Alaska Airlines Inc. AS TAM Airlines  JJ Scandinavian Airlines Sys. SK 
Royal Air Maroc AT Spanair S.A. JK Sabena Belgian World Air. SN 
Finnair Oy AY Japan Air Lines Co. Ltd. JL Sun Country Airlines SY 
Alitalia AZ Korean Air Lines Co. Ltd. KE TAP Portugal TP 
JetBlue Airways B6 Klm Royal Dutch Airlines KL ATA Airlines TZ 
British Airways Plc BA Lan-Chile Airlines.  LA USA3000 Airlines U5 
British Midland Airways Ltd. BD Lufthansa German Airlines LH United Air Lines Inc. UA 
Eva Air (Taiwan) BR Polskie Linie Lotnicze LO US Airways Inc. US 
China Airlines Ltd. CI Lan Peru LP Air Europa UX 
Compania Panamena (Copa) CM Swiss International Airlines LY Virgin Australia VA 
Continental Air Lines Inc. CO Malév Hungarian Airlines MA Vietnam Airlines VN 
Cathay Pacific CX Compania Mexicana De Aviaci MX Virgin Atlantic Airways VS 
China Southern Airlines CZ North American Airlines NA ACES Colombia  VX 
Delta Air Lines Inc. DL All Nippon Airways Co. NH West Jet WS 










Recall that the vector of state variables shown in equation (16) is: 
𝑦𝑖𝑚𝑡 ≡ {𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑡, 𝑅𝑖𝑚𝑡
∗ , 𝑂𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠_𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑡 , 𝑇𝑡
𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒/𝐴𝑇𝐼
} 
Transition rules for state variables are as follows: 










𝑂𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠_𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡                                                  (B3) 
where 𝜁𝑖𝑚𝑡
𝑅  and 𝜁𝑖𝑚𝑡
𝑂𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠_𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡
are assumed to be normally distributed.  
The joint transition probabilities of the state variables are determined by: 
𝐹𝑖
𝜎(𝑦𝑡+1|𝑎𝑖𝑡,𝑦𝑡) = {
1{𝑠𝑖,𝑡+1 = 1} ∗ Pr𝑅 ∗ Pr𝑂𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠_𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑟(𝑇𝑡
𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒/𝐴𝑇𝐼
= 1|𝑦𝑡) ∗ Pr𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝 
1{𝑠𝑖,𝑡+1 = 0} ∗ Pr𝑅
′ ∗ Pr𝑂𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠_𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑟(𝑇𝑡
𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒/𝐴𝑇𝐼
= 1|𝑦𝑡) ∗ Pr𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝




∗ ) ∗ ∏ 𝐹𝑅(𝑅𝑗𝑡+1
∗ |𝑅𝑗𝑡
∗ )𝑗≠𝑖      (B5) 
Pr𝑂𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠_𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡      = 𝐹𝑂𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠_𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝑂𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠_𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡+1|𝑂𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠_𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡) ∗
∏ 𝐹𝑂𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠_𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝑂𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠_𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑗𝑡+1|𝑂𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠_𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑗𝑡)𝑗≠𝑖                   (B6) 
Pr𝑅
′ = 1{𝑅𝑖𝑡+1
∗ = 0} ∗ ∏ 𝐹𝑅(𝑅𝑗𝑡+1
∗ |𝑅𝑗𝑡
∗ )𝑗≠𝑖                                              (B7) 
𝑃𝑟(𝑇𝑡
𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒/𝐴𝑇𝐼





𝑇𝑂𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠_𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡)                                                        (B8) 
Pr𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝 = ∏ 𝑃𝑟(𝑠𝑗𝑡+1 = 𝜎𝑗(𝑦𝑗𝑡, 𝜀𝑗𝑡)|𝑦𝑗𝑡)𝑗≠𝑖                                                           (B9) 
Table A5  
Comparison of Standard Logit Demand Model and Random Coefficients Logit Demand Model on Select 
Predicted Market Outcomes 
 “oneworld Event Sample” 
 Standard Logit Model 
Predicted Estimates  




[mean; (std. error)] 
Difference in Predicted 
Estimates Between the 
two Models 
[mean; (std. error)] 
Own Price Elasticity (%) [-1.09; (0.0027)] [-2.12; (0.0052)] [1.03; (0.0025)] 
Product Level Markups ($) [952.71; (0.126)] [486.35; (0.064)] [466.37; (0.063)] 
Quarterly Variable Profitsa ($) [66,066.39; (2,599.6)] [19,648.82; (772.84)] [46,417.57; (1,826.76)] 
    
 “ATI Event Sample” 
Own Price Elasticity (%) [-2.11; (0.0034)] [-3.66; (0.0042)] [1.56; (0.0012)] 
Product Level Markups ($) [521.47; (0.0213)] [278.89; (0.0747)] [242.58; (0.0755)] 
Quarterly Variable Profitsa ($) [36,498.57; (587.63)] [31,752.06; (511.21)] [4,746.51; (76.42)] 
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Appendix C: Representation of Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) using Conditional 
Choice Probabilities (CCPs) 
Recall that the expected one-period profit function for airline i is as follows: 
𝛱𝑖𝑚𝑡(𝑎𝑖𝑡, 𝑦𝑡) = 𝑅𝑖𝑚𝑡
∗ − 𝑎𝑖𝑚𝑡(𝐹𝐶𝑖 + (1 − 𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑡)𝐸𝐶𝑖)            (C1) 
Based on equation (C1), note that 𝛱𝑖𝑚𝑡(0, 𝑦𝑡) = 𝑅𝑖𝑚𝑡
∗  and 𝛱𝑖𝑚𝑡(1, 𝑦𝑡) = 𝑅𝑖𝑚𝑡
∗ − 𝐹𝐶𝑖 − (1 − 𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑡)𝐸𝐶𝑖. 
Following Aguirregabiria and Ho (2012), we represent the MPE as a vector of conditional choice 
probabilities (CCPs), P = {Pi(y): for every firm and state (i, y)}, where P solves the fixed point problem 𝑃 =






𝑃(𝑦)) : 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 (𝑖, 𝑦)}          (C2) 
where 𝜓(. ) is the CDF of the type 1 extreme value distribution, and 
?̃?𝑖
𝑃(𝑦) = 𝑍𝑖(1, 𝑦) − 𝑍𝑖(0, 𝑦) + 𝛽[𝐹𝑖,𝑦
𝑃 (1) − 𝐹𝑖,𝑦
𝑃 (0)] × 𝑤𝑧,𝑖
𝑃           (C3) 
?̃?𝑖
𝑃(𝑦) = 𝛽[𝐹𝑖,𝑦
𝑃 (1) − 𝐹𝑖,𝑦
𝑃 (0)] × 𝑤𝑒,𝑖
𝑃                          (C4) 
𝑤𝑧,𝑖
𝑃 = (1 − 𝛽 ∗ 𝐹𝑖,𝑦𝑃̅̅ ̅̅ )
−1 × {𝑃𝑖(𝑦) ∗ 𝑍𝑖(1, 𝑦) + [1 − 𝑃𝑖(𝑦)] ∗ 𝑍𝑖(0, 𝑦)}       (C5) 
𝑤𝑒,𝑖
𝑃 = (1 − 𝛽 ∗ 𝐹𝑖,𝑦𝑃̅̅ ̅̅ )
−1 × [𝑃𝑖(𝑦) ∗ 𝑒𝑖
𝑃]                      (C6) 
and 
𝐹𝑖,𝑦𝑃̅̅ ̅̅ = [𝑃𝑖(𝑦) × 1𝑀
′ ) ∗ 𝐹𝑖,𝑦
𝑃 (1) + ((1 − 𝑃𝑖(𝑦)) × 1𝑀
′ ) ∗ 𝐹𝑖,𝑦
𝑃 (0)]         (C7) 
𝐹𝑖,𝑦𝑃̅̅ ̅̅ = [𝑃𝑖(𝑦) × 1𝑀
′ ) ∗ 𝐹𝑖,𝑦
𝑃 (1) + ((1 − 𝑃𝑖(𝑦)) × 1𝑀
′ ) ∗ 𝐹𝑖,𝑦
𝑃 (0)]         (C8) 
𝑤𝑧,𝑖
𝑃  and 𝑤𝑒,𝑖
𝑃  are vectors of valuations that depend on CCPs and transition probabilities, but not on the dynamic 
parameters being estimated. Since 𝜀𝑖𝑚𝑡 is assumed type 1 extreme value distributed, 𝑒𝑖
𝑃 is a function vector equal 
to 𝑒𝑖
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